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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF 
Travis S. Irwin, for the Master of Arts degree in Criminology and Criminal Justice, 
presented on 6 July 2010, at Southern Illinois University Carbondale.  
TITLE: SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND CULTURE: APPLYING CROSS-NATIONAL 
INDICATORS OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
 
MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Nancy Morris 
Despite the increase in terrorism research post September 11, 2001, little is known 
about domestic terrorism though it occurs at overwhelmingly higher rates as compared to 
transnational terrorism. Although the use of criminological theory and methods to study 
terrorism has increased recently, there are relatively few terrorism studies within the 
criminological literature. Drawing upon extant criminological theories of violence among 
countries, this study uses the recently created Global Terrorism Database to examine the 
distribution and correlates of domestic terrorism among 72 developed nations between 
1970 and 1997. This study examined the following questions. First, do prior established 
predictors of criminal violence (i.e., economy, inequality, social welfare, political 
orientation, ethnic fractionalization, population, and pre-existing violence) also predict 
domestic terrorism at the country level? Second, is the relationship between these macro-
structural and cultural variables in the same direction as found in the previously 
published literature? Using a series of contemporaneous cross-sectional analyses and 
lagged cross-sectional analysis, the results from this study indicate that there is 
considerable similarity between the correlates of cross-national homicide and correlates 
of domestic terrorism. There was considerable evidence for the relationship between 
population size and overall levels of domestic terrorism. This relationship was robust 
across short time intervals (1970s), the full time span (1970-1997), as well as in the long 
and short term lagged analyses (1970-1990 predictors of domestic terrorism in 1991-1997 
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and 1991-1994 predictors on 1995-1997 domestic terrorism). On the contrary I did not 
find evidence that large youth populations are significantly related to higher levels of 
domestic terrorism. Income inequality (GINI) also emerged as a significant correlate of 
domestic terrorism in the long and short term contemporaneous analyses. Those countries 
that had higher overall levels of income inequality for the entire time span also had 
higher levels of domestic terrorism, compared to those countries with low levels of 
income inequality. Contrary to theoretical expectations yet supportive of prior 
criminological research, this study found that stronger democracies actually have more 
domestic terrorism. In particular, those countries with more restrictions placed on 
executive decision-making power, tend to have more domestic terrorism events, 
compared to those countries with less restrictive executive decision-making processes. 
This study concludes with a discussion of the results within the larger criminological 
literature as well as future avenues of research.   
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Terrorism has become a popular subject for all media outlets following the 
American attacks of September 11th. The 9/11 Commission Report (2004) provides 
graphic statistics of that day’s death toll: 256 people died on the four planes, 156 died at 
the Pentagon, and over 2600 perished at New York’s World Trade Center. This was not 
the first terrorist attack on American soil, but it has become the motivation for many to 
gain a better understanding of the complexities of terrorism. In a reaction to the 2001 
terrorist attacks, Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), now the 
third largest cabinet agency (National Academy of Public Administration, 2009), and 
tasked them with the protection of the United States from future terrorism (DHS, 2009a). 
In 2010 alone, the DHS (2009b) has a fiscal budget over 55 billion dollars. The number 
of terrorism studies has expanded in light of our governmental concern over national 
safety and the enormity of federal budgeting in this field. LaFree and Dugan (2007) are 
timely in creating and making available the Global Terrorism Database. Using the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD) and other country level data sets, this thesis examines 
structural and cultural covariates of approximately 19,886 domestic terrorism incidents 
among 72 developed countries between 1970 and 1997. Specifically, I examined the 
associations between domestic terrorism and economic development, economic 
inequality, social welfare expenditures, political orientation, ethnic fractionalization, 
population, and pre-existing violence.  
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Problem/Debate 
Terrorism has been defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and 
violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation” (LaFree & Dugan, 2007, p.184). A number of other possible definitions of 
terrorism have been used by researchers publishing on this topic (Hoffman, 2006; Schmid 
& Jongman, 2005). The reasoning behind the use of this specific definition will be 
explained in the following chapter. The terrorism phenomenon is broad, complex, and 
has been examined by academics from various fields that include political science, 
psychology, economics, sociology, and criminology. Despite the widespread interest, the 
extent of research on terrorism within criminology has been mostly atheoretical and non-
empirical (Damphousse & Smith, 2004), and relatively little is known about domestic 
terrorism as compared to transnational (Sanchez-Cuenca & de la Calle, 2009). Clearly, 
terrorism can be classified as transnational, international or domestic. LaFree and Dugan 
(2009, p.440) present the differences:  
In general, transnational terrorist attacks are those involving a national or a group of 
nationals from one country crossing international borders and attacking targets in 
another country. Domestic attacks are those involving a national or a group of 
nationals attacking targets in their home country.1 
 
International terrorism is often used interchangeably with transnational terrorism 
even though it differs in definition. The U.S. State Department (2009, p.331) defines 
international terrorism as “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one 
                                                          
1
 The Global Terrorism Database Codebook 3.0 emphasizes the nationality of the target that was attacked 
and the nationality of the attackers. They fail to mention any case of a U.S. entity attacked on foreign soil, 
if that signifies a transnational or domestic incident. Likewise, LaFree and Dugan (2009) give an example 
of Nigerian nationals attacking the Nigerian embassy in the United States as a transnational incident by 
most open-source databases.  
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country.”  Whereas, multiple researchers (Burgoon, 2006; Enders & Sandler 1993) use a 
transnational terrorism definition, they still apply it to some version of Mickolus, Sandler, 
Murdock, and Flemming’s (2004) data set titled International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events (ITERATE).  
Before Americans lived through the era of The Global War on Terrorism, one 
prominent act of domestic terrorism struck the hearts of many. On April 19th, 1995, 
Timothy McVeigh bombed the Oklahoma City Federal Building killing 168 people and 
injuring more than six hundred (Oklahoma City National Memorial, 2009). Domestic 
terrorism, a subcategory of terrorism that is devoid of foreign involvement (LaFree & 
Dugan, 2007), can obviously be as devastating as the international version, yet the 
amount of published domestic terrorism research is relatively miniscule (Freilich, 2003; 
Freilich & Pridemore, 2005; Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; Strentz, 1988). Not to 
mention, researchers agree that the overwhelming number of terrorist incidents are 
domestic (Abadie, 2006; Dugan & Young, 2008; Findley & Young, 2010; LaFree, Yang, 
& Crenshaw, 2009). In LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw’s (2009) analysis of 16,346 terrorist 
attacks on non-U.S. targets, a staggering 15,225 attacks and 35,322 of the 38,113 
fatalities were deemed domestic. This equated to 90% of the total attacks and 84% of the 
total fatalities. This heightens the need for domestic terrorism research.  
Though it is agreed that terrorism is a horrific criminal offense, criminological 
theory has been relatively nonexistent in terrorism research (Rosenfeld, 2004), whereas 
economic, sociological, and political-based theories have filled this gap. LaFree and 
Dugan (2004) promote the use of criminological theory coupled with criminological data 
collection and methods to the study of terrorism. After examining available 
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criminological theories relevant to the study of terrorism, one theory in particular has 
never been formally linked to terrorism although the core thesis could potentially apply to 
the motivation to commit such acts as well.  
In Crime and the American Dream, Messner and Rosenfeld (2006b) claim that the 
United States’ patterns and higher rate of serious crime is the product of American 
cultural and structural organizations (i.e., the American Dream). They conceptualize the 
American Dream as a “cultural commitment to the goal of economic success, to be 
pursued by everyone under conditions of open, individual competition” (Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 1994, p.6). Drawing from Robert K. Merton’s prior anomie work, Messner 
and Rosenfeld (1994) developed a macro-sociological theory of crime branded as 
institutional anomie theory (hereafter, IAT).2 Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) posit that a 
cultural emphasis on financial success exists to the point that the American economy 
dominates our major societal institutions, such as school, family, and politics.  
Messner and Rosenfeld (2001, p.199) claim that our society is incapable of 
strongly regulating its members through social norms because an economic “institutional 
balance of power” contributes to weakened control and increased pressure to criminally 
offend. Anomie becomes apparent in the eroding of social norms (Rosenfeld & Messner, 
2006). When these social norms lose their ability to govern the behavior of its societal 
members, there becomes “an increasing likelihood that people will pursue their goals ‘by 
any means necessary,’ including criminal means” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2006a, p.129-
130). The pursuit of a goal at all costs, including illegal means, carries very similar 
undertones to many terrorism definitions found in Hoffman’s (2006) review of terrorism. 
                                                          
2
 They also draw from Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx to formulate their theory of IAT. 
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In short, terrorism is a subset of lethal violence where IAT has been used as an 
explanation at the cross-national level. Messner and Rosenfeld’s IAT is relatively young 
and abstract in nature, as a result it is difficult to operationalize some of their key 
concepts and establish a research method that is amenable to complete tests of their 
theory (Cullen, Parboteeah, & Hoegl, 2004; Jensen, 2002).  
It can be argued that IAT is an American-centric theory that holds little relevance 
to other nations with assumedly less economically driven people. Cao (2004) and Jensen 
(2002) both use World Values Survey data to debate the American exceptionalism 
component by finding other nations actually have similar cultural orientations to the 
United States. Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) present that IAT is meant to explain macro-
level variations among serious criminal offending. This cross-national study on terrorism 
fits both of these requirements. Also, Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) used nations as the 
unit of analysis in their own empirical test of the theory.      
Thesis 
Using data taken from several data sets, this study examined if prior macro-
structural and cultural predictors of cross-national variations in homicide and terrorism 
(i.e., economy, inequality, social welfare, political orientation, ethnic fractionalization, 
population, and pre-existing violence) also predict domestic terrorism at the country 
level. This thesis draws upon extant literature as well as a similar study conducted 
recently by Mullins and Young (2009), as a springboard for the current study. The 
findings of such research could support LaFree and Dugan’s (2004) position that 
criminological theory should be more prevalent among terrorism research, while laying 
the groundwork for future criminological theory to be linked to terrorism.  
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Outline 
The ensuing thesis is outlined as follows. Chapter I provides the introduction and 
outline. Chapter II defines and conceptualizes terrorism, and provides a foundation for 
measuring the phenomena, this includes the many definitional complexities of terrorism 
and available data sets. Chapter III explains terrorism through a review of prior research 
and empirical findings. Theoretical postulations are derived from Messner and 
Rosenfeld’s (1994) institutional anomie theory, along with social structural strain and 
cultural theories common in literature on lethal violence at the country level. Chapter IV 
outlines the research design. The purpose and hypotheses are revisited. Sample, variables, 
data sources, and the analytical strategy are all subheadings within this section. In 
Chapter V, the findings are presented. Lastly, Chapter VI completes this paper through a 
conclusion of the significance of the findings, methodological limitations, and a proposed 
future research direction.    
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CHAPTER II 
DEFINING AND MEASURING TERRORISM 
 
Terrorism: Conceptual and measurement discussion 
Bruce Hoffman (2006) uses the first chapter of his book Inside Terrorism to 
tackle the conceptually broad term. He posits that most people have a vague 
understanding of what is meant by terrorism but lack a more concrete and precise 
definition. This is in part blamed on modern media and their need to convey the complex 
phenomena of terrorism within a short allotted airtime (Hoffman, 2006). Hoffman (2006) 
provides examples of the broad assortment of violent acts that get labeled as terrorism: 
the bombing of buildings, political assassinations, civilian massacres by the hands of the 
military, poisoning grocery store produce, or contaminating medication at a pharmacy. 
Considering this, terrorism is an umbrella term that includes acts that are deemed 
criminal as well. Among Hoffman’s examples, there is mass murder, murder, war crimes, 
attempted murder, and tampering with pharmaceuticals. Yet many violent acts such as 
these may be incidents of terrorism. For a concept that encompasses a multitude of 
violence, it is not surprising to find different definitions.  
Our government alone has varying definitions among departments, and Hoffman 
(2006, p.31) quotes the differences. The Federal Bureau of Investigation defines terrorism 
as: 
the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or 
coerce a Government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance 
of political or social objectives.3 
                                                          
3
 Hoffman (2006, p.31) continues with the U.S. Department of Defense defining terrorism as “the 
calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate 
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological 
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The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) provides the U.S. Department of 
State with annually required terrorism statistics. In 2005, NCTC (2009, p.1) updated and 
broadened their definition of terrorism to “premeditated, politically motivated violence 
perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” 
This definition, along with the previous, is relatively similar to what has been used in 
prior terrorism research. Enders and Sandler (1999, p.147-148) use a definition that is 
common among terrorism researchers, “the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-
normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective through intimidation or fear 
directed at a large audience” (Koch & Cranmer, 2007; Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004; 
Rosendorff & Sandler, 2005). Many of these definitions are lengthy and include too 
much verbiage. The NCTC definition includes clandestine agents which add nothing to 
the definition and Enders and Sandler’s (1999) definition uses extra-normal violence 
which is vague and misleading. However, all of these definitions require some form of 
political motivation to be present for the act to be classified as terrorism. Gurr (1970, p.3) 
defines political violence in much the same way: “all collective attacks within a political 
community against the political regime, its actors – including competing political groups 
as well as incumbents – or its policies.” Terrorism is in essence a form of political 
violence, but not all forms of political violence can be classified as terrorism. 
The different definitions of terrorism are so vast that Schmid and Jongman (2005) 
found over a hundred different terrorism research definitions in their review of available 
literature. In Political Terrorism: A Research Guide, Schmid and Jongman (2005) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
objectives.” And the Department of Homeland Security defines it as “any activity that involves an act that 
is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and … must 
appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a 
government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping.”    
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examined 109 terrorism definitions and tabulated their findings to show the frequencies 
of definitional elements. Violence/force was present in 83.5% of the definitions, political 
in 65%, fear or terror emphasized in 51%, and threat was found in 47%.4 The definition 
of terrorism used by the creators of the Global Terrorism Database 1.1 (GTD) is similar 
to the multiple definitions previously quoted: “the threatened or actual use of illegal force 
and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, 
coercion, or intimidation” (LaFree & Dugan, 2007, p.184).5 This definition incorporates 
the top four elements Schmid and Jongman (2005) addressed in their review. This broad 
definition promotes more inclusion of incidents into the database (LaFree & Dugan, 
2007), yet it has the distinct combination of force/fear and a specific motive that is unique 
to terrorism. It can be argued that GTD’s definition is overly inclusive or too broad which 
can be a specific limitation for the use of GTD data. Whereas, LaFree and colleagues 
(2009) have noted the potential for measurement error in terrorism estimates produced by 
the GTD, particularly, the potential for confounding related violence with terrorism. The 
GTD is designed to exclude incidents that are state sanctioned or wartime related, 
however the researchers have acknowledged that during these periods of conflict it is 
often difficult conceptually and empirically to distinguish between terrorism, criminal 
acts or acts related to war/conflict (LaFree et al., 2009). Compared to the array of 
aforementioned definitions, the GTD’s terrorism definition is as appropriate as any. It is 
                                                          
4
 These are the top four definitional elements only. Reference Schmid and Jongman (2005) for the complete 
list of 22 elements reported.  
5
 Credit for this definition is given to the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service, whose research is 
incorporated into the GTD. PGIS transferred the original hard copy data to the University of Maryland to 
be stored and computerized (LaFree & Dugan, 2007).   
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clear, concise, and applicable to measurement. Where there is diversity in ways to define 
terrorism, there is also diversity in available data sets.    
Existing terrorism databases 
Terrorism researchers are often reliant on available data sets, and the act of 
terrorism itself poses some collection issues. Schmid and Jongman (2005), collaborating 
with R. Thysse, present a paradox for terrorism data. They claim that the nature of 
terrorist activities is semi-clandestine to begin with, and this creates a scarcity for data. 
On the contrary, Jenkins (1975, p.16) has argued that “terrorism is theatre” and often 
terrorist attacks are disguised to garner worldwide attention. Similarly, Schmid and 
Jongman (2005, p.137) state that an abundance of “terrorist atrocities” data exists because 
of its appeal to Western press.  
LaFree and Dugan (2004) also address the untraditional data collection qualities 
of terrorism compared to other forms of crime. Most crime data is collected through 
“official” sources (i.e., police reports or sentencing statistics) and victimization or self-
report surveys. It is difficult to obtain terrorism data using the methods for these sources. 
For one, victimization and self-report information would be extremely difficult due to the 
rarity of terrorism in general. Second, LaFree and Dugan (2004) find two major faults to 
official terrorism data collection: data collected by governments have political biases and 
most suspected terrorists do not get criminally charged with terrorism. As a result, open-
source data sets may be useful for examining terrorism.  
Table 1 replicates LaFree and Dugan’s (2004) review of prominent terrorist 
incident databases. They compared the scope, periods, and total number of incidents for 
eight widely used databases. The scope is the inclusion of domestic or international 
incidents or both. Recall that, domestic terrorism is an incident that lacks any known 
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foreign involvement (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). Transnational terrorism involves an 
incident in one nation with perpetrators, victims, or targets from another country (Li & 
Schaub, 2004), similar to the international terrorism definition found in the ITERATE 
data set as “the action’s ramifications may transcend national boundaries through the 
nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or 
human victims, or the mechanics of the resolution” (Mickolus & Heyman, 1981, p.154). 
LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009) used the Global Terrorism Database to 
analyze attack patterns of U.S. and non-U.S. targets by 53 terrorist groups that the U.S. 
government considers an American threat. Out of the 16,346 non-U.S. attacks, 15,225 or 
90% were domestic. This also included 84% of the fatalities. Abadie (2006) also 
highlights the fact that domestic terrorism is understudied though more common in 
occurrence than international terrorism. The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base reported a 
total of 240 international terrorist incidents to go along with the staggering 1,536 acts of 
domestic terrorism that occurred in 2003.6 Furthermore, LaFree and Dugan (2009) 
reviewed sources comparing transnational and domestic attacks to conclude that the ratio 
can be as high as seven to one. If the majority of terrorist incidents are domestic, it makes 
sense to use a data set that incorporates domestic terrorism to gain a more complete 
picture of the phenomena.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6Abadie (2006) references these numbers from the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, formerly 
www.tkb.org that no longer exists. 
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Table 1  
Major Archival Databases on Terrorist Incident Reports      
Author Scope Period Incidents 
PGIS (GTD) Domestic & International 1970-1997 67,179 
ITERATE International 1968-2000 10,837 
TWEED (Europe) Domestic 1950-1999 10,498 
U.S. Dept. of State International 1977-2001 10,026 
RAND International 1968-1997 8,509 
TRITON Domestic & International Mid 2000-Mid 2002 2,452 
RAND-MIPT Domestic & International 1998-2005 17,423 
COBRA International 1998-1999 1,041 
 Source: LaFree & Dugan (2004).                 
 
Among LaFree and Dugan’s (2004) assessment, other benefits associated with the 
use of certain data sets become evident. Private risk assessment companies have 
produced four of the databases (Cobra, Triton, Tweed, and Pinkerton Global Intelligence 
Services). Rather than government entities, such as data from the U.S. Department of 
State’s Patterns of Global Terrorism,7 data from private organizations may have less 
political bias than data collected from government entities (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). Of 
the top five data sets in terms of incidents recorded and years covered, only PGIS (now 
the GTD) includes domestic and international terrorism. The GTD also has more 
incidents than the rest of the databases combined. LaFree and Dugan (2004) attribute this 
to their broad definition which includes threatened use of force and their inclusion of both 
domestic and international incidents. The ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes 
of Terrorist Events) data is prominent among prior research (Enders & Sandler, 1993), 
                                                          
7
 This report is now titled Country Reports on Terrorism and is annually compiled by the National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). 
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but does not include domestic terrorism. Jan Engene (2007) presents a case for the 
benefits of the TWEED data set because of its focus on domestic terrorism that is 
committed within the same political system. The drawback to this data set is that it is 
restricted to 18 Western European countries.  
Schmid and Jongman (2005) also conducted an extensive review of databases 
available for terrorism research. Among the more than 15 data sets presented, none have 
the amount of global coverage or number of incidents found in the Global Terrorism 
Database. Many cover an equal or longer span of years, but nearly all fail to include the 
last two decades. The benefits of the PGIS database carry over to the Global Terrorism 
Database since it was used as the platform for its creation. LaFree and Dugan’s (2007) 
Introducing the Global Terrorism Database outline the creation of the GTD. Initially, the 
PGIS data was transferred to the University of Maryland for secure storage. The 
hardcopy information was later computerized and crosschecked with RAND and 
ITERATE incidents excluding state-sponsored terrorism. The coverage still only spanned 
1970-1997. In 2006, GTD managers received government funding to expand the data set 
beyond 1997. Now, the GTD uses a criteria committee of terrorist experts to review 
potential terrorist incidents for inclusion in the GTD. Recent studies have shown the 
expansion of the GTD well beyond the initial terrorist incidents (LaFree, Morris, & 
Dugan, 2009). The new cases capture over 120 incident variables that include the date, 
incident type, location, target, weapon, fatalities, injuries, and etc. The current GTD totals 
more than 80,000 transnational and domestic attacks from 1970 through 2007 
(www.start.umd.edu/gtd). The fact that it has a global coverage, includes both domestic 
and transnational terrorism by employing a broad terrorism definition, and the sheer 
14 
 
 
 
volume of incidents make the GTD an ideal data set for this empirical study of terrorism. 
It should be noted that open source data sets are not without biases (i.e., media bias) and 
may under estimate terrorism from certain countries. Efforts to combat some of these 
issues are further discussed in the methods section.  
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CHAPTER III 
EXPLAINING TERRORISM 
 
Terrorism: Proposed causes and empirical review 
Martha Crenshaw (1998) claims that terrorism has no single explanation, as such 
this study examined the association between several structural variables and domestic 
terrorism. Prior literature has indicated that economic development, economic inequality, 
social welfare spending, democratic political systems, ethnic fractionalization, 
population, and pre-existing violence are associated with terrorism at the country level 
(Abadie, 2006; Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004; Burgoon, 2006; Findley & Young, 
2009; Koch & Cranmer, 2007; Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004, Mullins & Young, 2009; 
Noricks, 2009; Wade & Reiter, 2007). These structural and cultural predictors of 
terrorism are also predictive of homicide at the cross-national level (Batton & Jensen, 
2002; Gartner, 1990; Krahn, Hartnagel, & Gartrell, 1986; LaFree & Kick, 1986; 
McDonald, 1976; Messner, Raffalovich, & Shrock, 2002; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1997; 
Neapolitan, 1994; 96; Pampel & Gartner, 1995; Savolainen, 2000; see LaFree 1999 for a 
review). 
A number of political scientists address the issue of grievances and political 
opportunity as root causes for terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Noricks, 2009; Ross, 1993).8 
Similarly, criminologists view grievances as analogous to economic stress/strain (LaFree 
                                                          
8
 Noricks (2009:11) conducted a “root causes of terrorism” review that is the most comprehensive to date. 
A table was created with 24 terrorism factors that were present in prior literature. Fifteen of those were seen 
as relevant situational factors: facilitative norms about use of violence, cultural propensity for violence, 
ideology/religion, political inequality, lacking political opportunity, reduced government capacity, 
relationships/social ties, humiliation, social instability, youth population growth, mobilizing structures, 
grievances, constrained civil liberties, perceived illegitimacy of regime, and repression.  
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& Dugan, 2009), which may pressure or compel “certain persons in the society to engage 
in nonconformist rather than conformist conduct”, such as domestic terrorism (Merton, 
1995, p.6-7). For example, social structures limit the ability of certain members of society 
from attaining goals, primarily economic goals (Merton, 1957). The following sections 
provide a brief theoretical and empirical review of the literature.  
Economic development 
Messner and Rosenfeld (1999, p.28) describe social institutions as “relatively 
stable configurations of statuses, roles, values, and norms that emerge from the basic 
functional requirements of a society.” All institutions perform two key functions: they 
regulate the behavior of their respective society through normative patterns and facilitate 
access to resources and rewards, either desired or necessary (Messner & Rosenfeld, 
1999). Strain becomes apparent when structural conditions “deprive people of the 
resources and rewards that they need, expect, or desire”, thus resulting in crime and 
violence (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1999, p.28). The economy is one such social institution 
charged with orchestrating the production and distribution of goods and services. Weaker 
economies will limit the availability of desired resources essentially pushing some 
individuals toward violence. Strong economic institutions, measured as higher gross 
domestic product per capita (GDP), may be related to reduced rates of lethal violence in 
two theoretical ways. First, the social control perspective would insinuate that nations 
with strong economic institutions are better able to channel its populace into conventional 
law-abiding behavior, reinforcing norms and behavior patterns counter to violence. 
Secondly, strain theories suggest that economic institutions may temper the social strain 
individuals feel as a result of economic strain, thereby reducing the motivation for violent 
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behavior (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; 1999). Thus, two perspectives predict a negative 
relationship between measures of economic development and criminal violence.  
However, in contrast, modernization theories predict a positive association 
between economic development and violence. Modernization theories infer that rapid 
economic development may erode social control and increase social strain, and economic 
stress argues that crime is a result of the direct impact of economic conditions (LaFree, 
1999; Messner, 1986). Specific to the cross-national homicide literature, the positive 
association between increasing economic development and homicide rates that is 
predicted in the modernization perspective is not what is commonly found in prior 
studies. LaFree states in his review (1999) that economic well-being is overwhelmingly 
found to be negative or null in the empirical literature (LaFree & Kick, 1986; Pampel & 
Gartner, 1995; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Neapolitan, 1994; 1996).  
Studies that examine economic development and terrorism expect to find a 
positive relationship. Blomberg et al. (2004, p.27) found support for their notion that the 
economic state can influence a group to resort to acts of terrorism, specifically:  
Terrorist attacks are more likely in countries with strong institutions and strong 
soldiering during bad economic times or under exploitive leaders. For example, in 
more affluent countries with stronger defense capabilities, it would be more 
challenging to mount a coup, making terrorism a more attractive option. 
 
Mullins and Young (2009, p.19) agree that terrorism is more attractive in stronger 
nations, and found that higher gross domestic production is significantly associated with 
domestic terrorism. They claim that societies with stronger governments and stable 
economies make it more difficult for “certain types of political resistance to succeed (i.e., 
civil wars, militias, etc.).” This leads resisting political members to choose terrorism over 
other forms of wide-spread resistance (Mullins & Young, 2009).  
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In opposition to some of the previous findings, Abadie (2006) used one of the 
more unique dependent variables found within the published literature when he examined 
the relationship between a terrorism risk rating score and various economic, political, 
social, and geographic variables for 186 countries. Using OLS regression to study GDP 
per capita, income inequality, political freedom, and ethnic and religious 
fractionalization, he failed to support the association between economic variables and 
terrorism. However, the data did show political freedom had a nonmonotonic effect on 
terrorism. Abadie’s global terrorism index is problematic due to the five factors that make 
up a country’s value.9 Whereas, Abadie failed to find significant support for economic 
and social characteristics among nations, Li and his associate have published two articles 
that report contradictory findings for GDP per capita and terrorism (Li, 2005; Li & 
Schaub, 2004).   
Li and Schaub (2004, p.248) found a negative relationship between economic 
development, examined with GDP per capita, and transnational terrorism across 112 
countries using the ITERATE data set. They report that “a 1% increase in the GDP per 
capita of a country decreases the expected number of transnational terrorist incidents 
within the country by 19.3%.” In a following study, Li (2005) again finds significance in 
the same direction for GDP per capita and transnational terrorism.  
Though GDP and terrorism has mixed findings in studies at the country level 
(Burgoon, 2006; Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004; Mullins & Young, 2009), I hypothesize 
                                                          
9
 Motivation, presence, scale, efficacy, and terrorism prevention are named as the five forecasting factors, 
yet the source of these are not identified. Comparing motivation or even terrorism prevention methods 
cross culturally is extremely problematic. Such aspects are often culturally specific.   
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that a country’s economic wealth is negatively related to their level of domestic 
terrorism.  
Inequality 
Social class stratification is a product of economic resources and how they are 
allotted to societal members. The lack of material resources or the deprivation can be the 
motivation needed to compel individuals toward criminal violence (Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 1999). As a country’s level of economic inequality increases, more people see 
the opportunities and rewards of others above their socioeconomic status as unobtainable 
or too difficult, thus resulting in the push toward criminal means. Whereas GDP has been 
used to capture absolute deprivation, income inequality emphasizes relative deprivation 
(Burton, Cullen, Evans, & Dunaway, 2004; Gurr, 1970).  
LaFree (1999) sees the positive association between economic inequality, 
routinely measured using the GINI coefficient, and homicide rates as among the most 
consistent findings within prior literature of cross-national homicide (LaFree & Kick, 
1986; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Messner et al., 2002; Neapolitan, 1994; 1996). Jacobs 
and Richardson (2008) used moving averages to study long-term (1975-1995) cumulative 
relationships between homicide rates and inequality among 14 developed, democratic 
nations. With a fixed-effects pooled time-series design, they were able to support their 
hypothesis with findings that economic inequality (GINI) had a positive and significant 
effect on homicide rates. Jacobs and Richardson (2008) use the study’s elasticities to 
suggest that a 10% increase in economic inequality produces an increase in the homicide 
rate by 4.4%.      
Similar to the consistency within the homicide research, prior terrorism research 
shows considerable support for the inequality argument (Koch & Cranmer, 2007; Li, 
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2005; Li & Schaub, 2004). Koch and Cranmer (2007) used the ITERATE terrorism data 
set to study 68 democracies from 1975 to 1997. They found that dispersion of wealth 
within a country, measured by the GINI coefficient, was positive and significantly 
associated with terrorism (also positive yet insignificant in Li, 2005).10 Therefore, I 
expect that increases in income inequality will lead to more domestic terrorism.  
Social welfare 
According to Messner and Rosenfeld (1997, p.1394), decommodification is a 
form of state sponsored social welfare protection that can temper social and economic 
strains resulting from “the vicissitudes of the market.” Social welfare is, in essence, 
assistance to cultural members that are in need. It is a source of strain reduction. Social 
welfare is a structural source of informal social control and support that helps offset some 
of the consequences of economic strain. Messner and Rosenfeld (1997), Savolainen 
(2000), and Batton and Jensen (2002) have used a decommodification index to capture 
social support and to explain variations in cross-national homicide rates among countries. 
Savolainen (2000, p.1023) clarifies what is meant by the term, “Decommodification 
refers to the degree to which the state protects the personal well-being of its citizens from 
market dynamics.” The decommodification process reflects the quality and quantity of 
social rights and protection from the state. This can temper or offset strains that result 
from institutional imbalance, or dominance of the economic system (Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 1997). Referencing Esping-Anderson (1990), Messner and Rosenfeld (1997, 
p.1395) list three essential dimensions of entitlements that encompass 
decommodification: “ease of access to them, their income-replacement value, and the 
                                                          
10
 Li (2005) acknowledges that the insignificance for inequality, measured by the GINI coefficient, could 
be due to its high correlation with GDP per capita. 
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range of social statuses and conditions they cover.” Prior studies using the 
decommodification index have found considerable support for the effect of social welfare 
on homicide rates (Batton & Jensen, 2002; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997, Savolainen, 
2000).11 
In regards to terrorism, Burgoon (2006) chooses to study the effect social welfare 
spending has on reducing domestic and international terrorism. Using a similar argument 
as Messner and Rosenfeld, he argues that social policies will reduce the economic 
insecurity, poverty, and inequality that drive some to terrorism. Burgoon (2006) used 
both cross-sectional and pooled time-series cross sectional estimation to examine the 
ITERATE data set on 95 countries from 1975 to 1995. By creating a total social security, 
education, and health expenditure variable that represented total welfare spending, 
Burgoon (2006) found a significantly negative correlation between social welfare 
expenditures and terrorism (both domestic and transnational). Some significance was also 
found with control variables: population (logged) and government capabilities (GDP per 
capita and share of world population) were both positively correlated with terrorism. 
Considering the apparent relief social welfare expenditures can give to economically 
strained individuals, it seems likely that increasing social welfare expenditures of a 
nation will lead to decreasing amounts of domestic terrorism.  
Democracy 
Another social institution discussed by Messner and Rosenfeld (1999, p.28) is a 
country’s political system “which mobilizes resources for collective goal attainment and 
distributes power across social positions.” Similar to the concept of social welfare, more 
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 Only partial support is found in Batton and Jensen (2002:6) where “decommodification is conceptualized 
as a historically variant and contextual variable.”  
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open political systems are an avenue to relieve strain. Disagreements in society can be 
addressed through local political representatives and elections. Whereas, societies that are 
more autocratic, may not have such options toward change readily available.  
Anomie leading to extreme actions, in this case domestic terrorism, is a potential 
consequence that arises from blocked opportunities found in less democratic society. 
Strain from political grievances can lead to terrorism if they are blocked legitimate 
opportunities (i.e., political openness) to voice those grievances. This also affects 
perceptions of political legitimacy (Tyler, 1990). Grievances form when the physical and 
material needs of societal members are not met by their government. In a similar fashion 
to how Rosenfeld and Messner (2006b) are describing an anomic culture born out the 
institutional imbalance of power, anomie and strain may arise when goals cannot be 
achieved or are perceived to be too difficult due to blocked legitimate opportunities 
associated with closed or less-open political systems. In regards to dealing with 
grievances, a democratic government is better equipped to listen to its constituents. 
  Krahn et al. (1986) examined the effects of political orientation on homicide for 
50 countries at four time points (1960, 1965, 1970, and 1975). Their correlation analysis 
suggests that homicide rates are higher among less democratic nations. LaFree and 
Tseloni (2006) consider three theoretical perspectives (civilization, conflict, and 
modernization) in their study of homicide trends among 44 nations. Using a sophisticated 
longitudinal analysis, they found that violent crime was highest for transitional 
democracies.    
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Regime type is also included in studies on terrorism (Burgoon, 2006; Koch & 
Cranmer, 2007; Li, 2005; Mullins & Young, 2009; Wade & Reiter, 2007).12 Burgoon 
(2006) used a democracy/autocracy index from the Polity IV data set as a control in his 
study of social spending and terrorism. He found a significantly negative correlation 
between democracy and terrorism. Secondly, in a study of 443 suicide attacks worldwide 
between 1980 and 2003, Wade and Reiter (2007) analyzed regime type and found limited 
support that more democratic states have more suicide terrorist incidents. Their results 
may potentially be biased due to the fact that more democratic societies see less press 
restrictions than autocratic countries (Wade & Reiter, 2007). 
Taking a completely different approach to the study of democracy and violence, 
Li (2005) argues against the uni-dimensional view of democracy. Using the ITERATE 
data set to analyze 119 countries from 1975 to 1997, he separated the positive and 
negative effects of democracy and found that satisfaction, political efficacy, and 
reduction of grievances common in democracies is in direct opposition to terrorist 
recruiting. On the contrary, institutional or government constraints were found to 
promote transnational terrorism (Li, 2005). By using a disaggregated measure of 
democracy, Li (2005) was better able to attribute key components of democratic regimes 
to higher and lower levels of terrorism that were often lost in the findings of other 
researchers that only employ a uni-dimensional measure. Risa Brooks (2009, p.756) 
promotes Li’s approach to the study of democracies where “the democracy and terrorism 
debate constitutes not one research question, but many.” She addresses the notion that 
                                                          
12
 Koch and Cranmer (2007) find that a democratic political orientation increases the likelihood of being an 
international terrorist target. They used the ITERATE terrorism data set for 1975 through 1997 and a 
political institution database that included 68 democracies. Using random effects negative binomial 
regression, they found that democracy is positively associated with terrorism.  
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being a democracy does not always translate into political access, similar to Li’s (2005, 
p.294) conclusion that institutional checks and balances prominent in democracies can 
often lead to political deadlock and increased “frustration of marginal groups.” Though 
Li’s (2005) findings are restricted to transnational terrorism, this does not dismiss the 
complexities of the relationship between democracy and terrorism.   
On one hand, the openness found within democracy-based nations would offer 
more avenues to address grievances that would otherwise not exist in non-democratic 
states, and subsequently lead to less terrorism. In contrast, political deadlock and policy 
inaction are counterproductive to the reduction of grievances which can heighten public 
frustration and increase levels of terrorism (Dugan & Young, 2008; Li, 2005). This multi-
dimensional argument of democracy can account for some of the contradictory findings 
in prior literature. Measuring political orientation through a democracy/autocracy 
dichotomy limits the theoretical understanding of any findings (Gates, Hegre, Jones, & 
Strand, 2006). Thus, more restrictions on executive decision-making power will lead to 
increased domestic terrorism. However, the overall benefits of democracy and grievance 
relief can outweigh the minimal chance that political decision-making ever reaches 
deadlock to the point that terrorism rates actually increase because of it. Considering this, 
but not to ignoring the fact that democracy is a complex variable, countries with stronger 
democracies, versus autocracies, will be negatively related to their level of domestic 
terrorism.    
Ethnic fractionalization 
Crenshaw (1981, p.383) posits that a direct cause of terrorism is a “concrete 
grievance among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population.” Ethnic 
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fractionalization further perpetuates these grievances by adding another dimension of 
blocking upward social mobility (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Referencing Sellin (1938), 
Krahn et al. (1986, p.275) suggest that culturally heterogeneous societies produce higher 
rates of crime “because dominant group norms proscribe the behavior valued by minority 
cultural groups.” In reference to the prior work on racial inequality conducted by Blau 
and Blau (1982), Messner and Rosenfeld (1999, p.31) consider “the general thrust of their 
thesis is that racial inequality leads to strong pressures to commit acts of criminal 
violence and to weak social controls against doing so.” Race, in particular, is a strong 
socio-demographic correlate to homicide rates, whereas disadvantaged minorities are 
grossly overrepresented among offenders and victims (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1999). 
Ethnic heterogeneity variables are common throughout cross-national homicide studies, 
yet to-date they fail to be consistently supported (LaFree, 1999).13 Whereas, ethnic 
fractionalization has been linked to terrorism in non-empirical efforts (Crenshaw, 1981; 
Noricks, 2009), it struggles to be broadly studied empirically.    
Population 
Two theoretical arguments link age structure to the changes in overall levels of 
crime (Messner, 1999). One argument is compositional, in which higher overall rates of 
crime/violence are expected when countries have a large population of youth or young 
males. The second theoretical perspective, the Easterlin hypothesis, predicts that crime 
rates change as a function of both contextual and compositional factors. For example, 
                                                          
13
 On one side, Gartner (1990) finds support for ethnic heterogeneity and homicide among her study of 18 
developed nations between 1950 and 1980. Contrary to these findings, McDonald (1976) reports that racial 
heterogeneity does not increase levels of homicide. Fearon and Laitin (2003) focused on 127 civil wars 
between 1945 and 1999. Their review of the relevant literature expressed that countries with more ethnic 
and religious diversity are associated with higher civil war risk. Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) findings suggest 
otherwise.  
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Messner (1999, p.36) notes that a large youth population can lead to “labor market 
crowding and overburdened institutions”, in turn, this influences the crime rate. Large 
populations exceed the capacity of available occupations and the weakened/overburdened 
social institutions may fail to exercise effective social control within a society. Easterlin’s 
(1987) proposed argument has received mixed support (see Messner 1999).    
A basic population argument specific to terrorism is that “states with more people 
should be more likely to generate individuals willing to use violence” (Mullins & Young, 
2009, p.12). This is based on sheer numbers alone, thus reflecting the compositional 
argument. Burgoon (2006) also points out that more people equates to more targets. 
Population is found to be significantly correlated and in a positive direction for nearly 
every study that employs this measure (Burgoon, 2006; Koch & Cranmer, 2007; Mullins 
& Young, 2009; Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004; Wade & Reiter, 2007).  
Pre-existing violence 
Several scholars have examined if the extent to which cultural factors or the 
culture of violence may explain cross-national variations in violence (Archer & Gartner, 
1984; Gartner, 1990; Mullins & Young, 2009; Neapolitan, 1994). Specifically to 
homicide, Gartner (1990) examined 18 developed nations for a time span of 1950-1980. 
She found that post-war developed democracies accounted for the variation in risks of 
homicide. Previously, Archer and Gartner (1984) found an increase in domestic 
homicides followed participation in war. Furthermore, Neapolitan (1994) explored Latin 
American nations due to their disproportionately high rates of homicide compared to all 
other countries throughout the world. He attempted to explain these high rates through 
country level structural and demographic characteristics common to homicide. His 
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findings support that this region has a strong positive association with homicide rates net 
of the variables within the study. Neapolitan (1994) argues that this is accounted for by 
the cultural values of Latin American nations being more conducive to violence.   
Mullins and Young (2009) specify a legitimation-habituation model to explain 
such cross-national violence. Specifically, the legitimation-habituation thesis expects that 
prior levels of illegal and legitimate violence within a society will predict current levels 
of violence. Using GTD data, Mullins and Young (2009) conducted a time-series cross-
sectional analysis of terrorism using a zero-inflated negative binomial regression. Their 
main purpose was to see if a culture’s general violence is significantly related to a 
society’s level of terrorism. They included measures of violence such as country level 
homicide rates, the practice of capital punishment, and a recent experience with external 
violence such as war (lagged 1 year prior) in order to capture a “culture of violence.” All 
violence measures were found to be significant, and two of three were in the predicted 
direction (capital punishment was not), concluding with the view that a culture of 
violence was a relevant predictor for terrorism (c.f., Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004; Wade 
& Reiter, 2007).14   
The previous sections were a review of the theoretical and empirical literature 
regarding the major structural and cultural correlates of variations in cross-national 
violence. The current study draws upon prior cross-national homicide research within 
criminology, as well as extant terrorism research within political science, as a basis for 
forming the theoretical expectations for the relationships between structural and cultural 
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 Mullins and Young (2009:20) state that the capital punishment findings were “an artifact of the data” 
where some countries had abolished capital punishment in hopes of joining the European Union while other 
abolition was done in the aftermath of abusive regimes. 
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factors and domestic terrorism at the country level. In addition, there are also 
criminological theories related to such macro-social structural and cultural explanations 
that may be amenable to explaining cross-national variations in domestic terrorism. One 
such theory is Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1997) institutional anomie theory.  
Theoretical framework: IAT 
As reviewed in the previous sections, there are several perspectives within 
sociology and criminology (e.g., modernization, strain) that expect macro-social 
variables, such as economic development, to be significantly related to cross-national 
variations in violence. Messner and Rosenfeld’s IAT essentially posits that institutional 
imbalance of power within a country can lead to high levels of crime caused by 
widespread anomie and weakened social controls. They focus on the following social 
institutions: economy, family, education, religion, and polity. Rosenfeld and Messner 
(2006) describe the normal functions of these institutions. The physical and material 
needs of the populace are met by the economy, political systems are in place for the 
population to achieve collective goals, and the management of cultural patterns and social 
control are the keys to family, education, and religion (Rosenfeld & Messner, 2006). The 
overlapping of these institutions is common, but one social institution often dominates 
the others (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001).   
Messner and Rosenfeld (2001, p.195) state, “The core elements of the American 
Dream- a strong achievement orientation, a commitment to competitive individualism, 
universalism, and most important, the glorification of material success- have their 
institutional underpinnings in the economy.” For Messner and Rosenfeld (2001), the 
United States is distinctly different from other capitalist societies because of our inflated 
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weight we place on financial success and our unreserved openness for innovation, thus 
the United States is dominated by the economic institution. Messner and Rosenfeld 
(2001) claim that economic dominance weakens the ability of other social institutions to 
control or mold individual behavior, such that they are unable to temper the stress that 
results from the dominant institution. Essentially, we have “economic dominance” that is 
manifested in three ways: “(1) in the devaluation of noneconomic institutional functions 
and roles; (2) in the accommodation to economic requirements by other institutions; and 
(3) in the penetration of economic norms into other institutional domains” (Messner & 
Rosenfeld, 2001, p.196). Examples of each are clearly defined in Messner and 
Rosenfeld’s (2001) work.  
They explain devaluation with education being seen as a means for getting a good 
job, the knowledge itself is not the priority for most students, quality teachers rarely 
receive rewards that would be given in the business world, parenting becomes assumed 
not admired, and the lack of political involvement (i.e., voting) would rarely cause a 
reaction while on the contrary, not working if capable is socially degraded. Second, 
competing social institutions are routinely overpowered by the demands of the economy. 
Because of this, the dominated social institutions accommodate and conform for the 
economic institutions. Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) continue with examples. A family 
bases their time spent together, schedules, and vacations around their employers 
demands. Also, without a job, one would struggle to even raise a family. Education levels 
mirror the job market where higher degrees earn better paychecks. School expenditures 
(i.e., number of faculty or classroom materials) rely heavily on financial resources. 
Finally, Messner and Rosenfeld (2001) elaborate on how the economy penetrates its 
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norms into other social institutions. Grades are the basis for individual student 
evaluations that create competition for rewards, successful politicians are deliverers of 
goods, and family households are typically broken down into a “division of labor” with 
managers being the “breadwinner” (Messner & Rosenfeld, 2001, p.198). 
Overall, the institutional imbalance of power from an overly dominant economic 
system may weaken social control and eventually, result in higher levels of criminal 
offending. Whereas, some support for IAT has been found in recent research (Chamlin & 
Cochran, 1995; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Maume & Lee, 2003; Messner & Rosenfeld, 
1997; Pratt & Godsey, 2003; Savolainen, 2000; Stucky, 2003), there are a number of 
researchers who found mixed support (Batton & Jensen, 2002; Cullen, Parboteeah, & 
Hoegl, 2004; Piquero & Piquero, 1998) or no support for the theory (Cao, 2004; Jensen, 
2002).15 However, many are partial tests of the theory, and only examine a few of the 
institutions and resulting dynamics. Nonetheless, IAT is a potentially useful theory for 
explaining levels of domestic terrorism across countries as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 See Messner and Rosenfeld (2006a) for a thorough review.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS 
 
Terrorism is a phenomenon that is disproportionately domestic versus 
transnational, yet mass media and prior researchers tend to focus on the latter. The 
purpose of this thesis was to answer two distinct questions. First, do prior established 
predictors of criminal violence (i.e., economy, inequality, social welfare, political 
orientation, ethnic fractionalization, population, and pre-existing violence) also predict 
domestic terrorism at the country level? Second, will the relationship between these 
macro-structural and cultural variables be in the same direction as found in the previously 
published work? Until very recently, published articles on terrorism were relatively 
atheoretical and non-empirical (c.f., Dugan, LaFree & Piquero, 2005; LaFree, Dugan & 
Korte, 2009; Mullins & Young, 2009), however this is rapidly changing with the advent 
of recently compiled terrorism data sets. Drawing upon recent work on terrorism, this 
study used criminological theory and the GTD to explore the structural and cultural 
factors associated with domestic terrorism. The following hypotheses were the core focus 
of this thesis:  
H1: A country’s economic wealth is negatively related to their level of domestic 
terrorism.  
H2: Increases in income inequality is associated with more domestic terrorism. 
H3: Higher social welfare expenditures of a nation are correlated with lower amounts 
of domestic terrorism. 
H4: More restrictions on executive decision-making power are associated with 
increased domestic terrorism. 
H5: Countries with stronger democracies, versus autocracies, will be negatively 
related to their level of domestic terrorism. 
  
These hypotheses were tested using the country as the unit of analysis and the 
observational period covering 27 years (1970-1997). Domestic terrorism data from the 
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Global Terrorism Database 1.1 was combined with variables taken from other publically 
available data sets for all years in which the data is available.  
Sample 
 The sample consists of 72 nations that rank in the “very high” and “high” human 
development categories of the Human Development Report (HDR) 2009. The Human 
Development Index (HDI) combines country level indicators of income, educational 
attainment and life expectancy into one social and economic development index (see 
HDR, 2009 for complete methodological explanation).16 Table 2 identifies the summary 
of nations and their respective human development indicator ranking as well as the sum 
of domestic terrorism incidents from 1970 to 1997. Although the GTD 1.1 contains 
terrorism data for over a 150 nations and territories, the current analysis is limited to a 
sample comprised mainly of developed countries. This decision was based primarily on 
the view that explanatory analyses of macro-structural characteristics on lethal violence 
are largely based on the experiences and social processes of modern, developed nations 
(Archer & Gartner 1984; Gartner, 1990; Jacobson & Richardson, 1995; Pampel & 
Gartner, 1995). Using developed countries also poses fewer missing data issues that tend 
to plague developing countries. As LaFree (1999) notes, cross-national data on social and 
political variables, as well as homicide data, tends to be more readily available for 
developed countries for longer periods of time. Lastly, since the GTD is primarily drawn 
from media accounts, it is likely that terrorism incidents are under-estimated for 
developing and least developed nations because they do not have the number of media 
sources or the coverage that is associated with more developed countries. Thus, 
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 The HDI classification of countries into development categories is relatively consistent across other 
country level development classification systems (e.g., World Bank and the OECD).  
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restricting the analysis to developed nations can overcome some of the potential reporting 
biases associated with using media reports of terrorism. However, there are certainly 
limitations of using a restricted sample comprised mainly of developed nations.  
Table 2 
Summary of Nations by HDI Ranking
Current Domestic Terrorism Current Domestic Terrorism
Country HDI Rank Sum 1970-1997 Country HDI Rank Sum 1970-1997
Albania 70 38 Latvia 48 8
Argentina 49 432 Lebanon 83 722
Australia 2 34 Libya 55 6
Austria 14 51 Lithuania 46 4
Bahamas 52 3 Luxembourg 11 13
Bahrain 39 25 Macedonia 72 2
Barbados 37 3 Malaysia 66 15
Belgium 17 48 Malta 38 9
Bosnia 76 48 Mauritius 81 1
Brazil 75 159 Mexico 53 227
Brunei 30 1 Netherlands 6 44
Bulgaria 61 23 New Zealand 20 7
Canada 4 18 Norway 1 6
Chile 44 1422 Oman 56 0
China 24 52 Panama 60 86
Colombia 77 3271 Peru 78 3469
Costa Rica 54 27 Poland 41 22
Croatia 45 11 Portugal 34 63
Cuba 51 23 Qatar 33 1
Cyprus 32 63 Romania 63 9
Czech Republic 36 9 Russia 71 214
Czechoslovakia * 7 Saudi Arabia 59 9
Denmark 16 25 Singapore 23 6
Ecuador 80 125 Slovakia 42 9
Estonia 40 8 Slovenia 29 5
Finland 12 3 South Korea 26 16
France 8 1136 Spain 15 1474
Germany 22 540 Sweden 7 22
Greece 25 316 Switzerland 9 37
Hungary 43 26 Trinidad and Tobago 64 10
Iceland 3 4 Turkey 79 1142
Ireland 5 47 United Arab Emirates 35 7
Israel 27 1062 United Kingdom 21 1170
Italy 18 883 United States 13 633
Japan 10 238 Uruguay 50 56
Kuwait 31 34 Venezuela 58 147
Total 19886
* Czechoslovakia split in 1993 to form the Czech Republic and Slovenia. 
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 LaFree (1999) argues that a major limitation of the current cross-national violence 
literature is that it has been based on a non-random set of countries. This results in four 
problems. First, much of what is known about the correlates of cross-national violence 
pertains mainly to Western industrialized countries. It is unclear if such results are 
generalizable in other countries with different social and political systems. Second, most 
studies use a small number of countries, thus results may be highly sensitive to outliers, 
and this is particularly problematic for analysis of rare outcomes at the macro-level. 
Third, the range of independent variables that can be included in the model is also 
restricted given the small sample size and the overall availability of data. Finally, there 
are often computational problems (e.g., severe multi-collinearity) associated with 
conducting traditional statistical analyses on a small sample of countries. As a result of 
these critiques of the extant cross-national violence literature as well as recent 
advancements in data availability for a broader set of countries, many scholars have taken 
the alternative approach of analyzing a much larger, diverse set of countries (Messner, 
1989; Mullins & Young, 2009; LaFree & Tseloni, 2006).  
For example, Mullins and Young (2009) have conducted cross-national research 
incorporating underdeveloped and developed nations and found that nations characterized 
by a culture of violence also have more domestic terrorism events over time. They used a 
much larger and diverse sample of countries (n = 174) over a longer period of time, 
which subsequently resulted in extensive missing data. To overcome these problems, they 
supplemented their listwise deletion based analyses with analyses based on multiple 
imputation techniques (see Allison, 2002), and found similar results. Thus, more recent 
research has utilized sophisticated statistical techniques to account for missing data at the 
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country level. The limitations of the current approach and the resulting implications of 
the findings are discussed in the concluding chapter.  
Variables and data sources 
Dependent variable 
The outcome variable used in the current study is originally taken from the Global 
Terrorism Database 1.1 (GTD). The GTD is a continuously updated data set that 
combines prior data collected by the Pinkerton Global Intelligence Service (PGIS) on 
every terrorist incident found in media accounts from 1970 to 1997 (National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism, 2009).17 PGIS used a broad 
terrorism definition of “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non 
state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, 
or intimidation” (LaFree & Dugan, 2007, p.184). LaFree and Dugan (2007, p.188) clarify 
that two of three elements had to be present for the incident to be included in the data set: 
(1) The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, 
or social goal. In terms of economic goals, the exclusive pursuit of 
profit does not satisfy this criterion (terrorist group fundraising is 
recorded).    
(2) There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) 
than the immediate victims.  
(3) The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare 
activities; that is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted 
by international humanitarian law.  
   
Domestic terrorism is defined based on the “lack of any known foreign 
involvement” (LaFree & Dugan, 2007, p.185). Recent work using the GTD data has 
disaggregated domestic events from international terror events (Mullins & Young, 2009) 
                                                          
17
 Data from 1993 was previously misplaced by PGIS during an earlier move, prior to the University of 
Maryland data team obtaining it. The missing data were missing completely at random and thus, the 
parameter estimates should not be affected by systematic bias (Allison, 2002).  
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using information taken from the “Target Entity” variable within GTD 1.1. The entity 
field refers to the type of organization, agency, individual, etc. that was the target of the 
attack. The first step in the coding process involved selecting only those terrorism 
incidents in which there was valid (i.e., known) information on the target entity. Second, 
all known entities that were affiliated with non-domestic associations, agencies or origin 
were coded as transnational (see Mullins & Young, 2009 for a complete review). Such 
cases as foreign business were coded as non-domestic while all military targets were 
excluded. Ambiguous cases were also disregarded.18 Although there are certainly 
limitations with ensuring that all cases in the analysis are domestic cases, this measure of 
domestic terrorism provides a useful and meaningful starting point for the current study. 
Alternative conceptualizations and measurements, and the subsequent implications for 
domestic terrorism research are discussed in the concluding chapter.     
The annual counts of domestic terrorism were transformed into an average 
number of domestic terrorism events per country for a given time period. A series of 
pooled contemporaneous and time ordered cross-sectional analyses using different 
lengths of the observational period were conducted. The outcome at each analysis reflects 
the average level of domestic terrorism for the time period examined in the analysis. For 
example, the multivariate analyses began with a model that uses the structural and 
cultural correlates to predict average domestic terrorism across the countries for the entire 
time period. Subsequent sensitivity analyses examined the same question in separate, 
                                                          
18
 Young and Dugan (2008) found that ambiguous cases resemble domestic ones, while foreign cases were 
the only kinds that seem to have different explanatory factors. It seems likely that since the majority of 
terrorism acts are domestic, most of the ambiguous cases are likely to be in this category.  
37 
 
 
 
shorter sub-intervals of time, and the outcome during those analyses reflects the average 
domestic terrorism level for the corresponding time period.  
Independent variables 
A codebook was created to visually clarify the concepts, variables, and chosen 
measurements for all variables in the model (see Appendix A). This study used per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP) in US dollars data from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators (2005) as an indicator of economic development. 
The GINI coefficient measures the level of income inequality or relative 
deprivation within a country (see Messner et al. 2002; World Income Inequality Database 
United Nations, 2000; see also Deininger & Squire, 1996). Following prior 
recommendations (Messner et al., 2002) this study only used those GINI indicators that 
are designated as high quality, based on gross income, and examine the household as the 
reference unit and estimate the entire population. In some instances multiple GINI 
indicators met these criteria. Following previous work, the average of the valid indicators 
was taken (Messner, et al., 2002). 
Social welfare is expressed through a decommodification index developed by 
Messner and Rosenfeld (1997). Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) constructed a proxy 
measure of social welfare on the national level by incorporating data for expenditures on 
social security programs, the sources of funding, and the varying expenditures across 
programs such as unemployment benefits, work-related injuries, and family allowances 
(see Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997, for a complete review). The International Labor Office 
(ILO) compiled the original data.    
Democracy is measured using Gates et al.’s (2006) Scalar Index of Polities. This 
regime indicator ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values approaching an stronger 
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democracy and lower values equating to a stronger autocracy. Gates et al. (2006) 
averaged scores along three institutional dimensions of how executives are elected (based 
on recruitment, competition, and openness of recruitment), constraints on executive 
decision-making power, and political participation (recent election total voter turnout and 
competition between parties). This measure is preferred over other polity indicators that 
are uni-dimensional (Dugan & Young, 2008; Mullins & Young, 2009), such as Koch and 
Cranmer (2007).  
Control variables  
The four independent variables are expected to account for a significant amount 
of cross-national variation in domestic terrorism. Multiple control measures were 
included to minimize the potential of model mis-specification and omitted variable bias. 
The ethnic fractionalization variable came from Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) internal 
instability study. They provide a measure that includes the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization (ELF) index from Atlas Narodov Mira 1964 data, which estimates the 
“probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a country are from different 
ethnolinguistic groups” (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p.78). This measure also includes CIA 
World Factbook estimates on the share of a country’s population in the largest ethnic 
group, and the number of separate languages spoken by at least 1% of the population.19     
As presented in the literature review, population is often included in empirical 
research on cross-national terrorism and homicide (Burgoon, 2006; Dugan & Young, 
2008; Koch & Cranmer, 2007; Mullins & Young, 2009; Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004; 
Wade & Reiter, 2007). This study incorporates a logged measure of population from the 
                                                          
19
 Fearon and Laitin (2003) filled in missing values using the CIA World Factbook, Encyclopedia 
Brittanica, and the Library of Congress Country Studies for all measures.  
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World Health Organization. Two other control variables relevant to country population 
are the age and sex distribution of the population. It is common to include a variable that 
estimates the sex ratio (number of males per hundred females) and the youth percentage 
of the total population (commonly expressed as percent aged 15-29) in cross-national 
homicide research (Gartner, 1990; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Messner et al., 2002; 
Pampel & Gartner, 1995). This is based on the amassed prior literature that relates more 
male-dominant and youthful populations to higher rates of criminal offending (LaFree, 
1999). This study uses data taken from the World Health Organization to measure both 
control variables.20 I also included a control variable to capture region of the world 
(categorically divided into 5 regions) in subsequent sensitivity analysis.21  
Considering the findings of Mullins and Young (2009) that violent cultures are 
associated with higher levels of terrorism, this study includes a control measure that 
attempts to capture pre-existing violence. Homicide data is generally considered the most 
reliable and valid form of violent crime data across different historical and cultural 
contexts (Batton & Jensen, 2002; LaFree, 1999). For example, Batton and Jensen (2002, 
p.15) have stated that “homicide is advantageous as an indicator of historical violence 
levels because it is less subject to definitional ambiguity, it is more likely to be reported 
                                                          
20
 The sex ratio and percent of a country’s total population aged 15-29 was derived from WHO data that 
has some country to country variations in sampling. In most cases, estimates come from general population 
data, yet in one country specific case (China), estimates only reflect portions of that country’s population 
(urban). If multiple population estimates were provided, the broadest coverage (i.e., total population over 
urban) was chosen.  
21
 Initially, a nine category variable (LaFree, Morris, & Dugan, 2009) was used to separate countries within 
the GTD. A comparison was conducted between a five region variable in Mullins and Young’s (2009) 
Culture of Violence data set and LaFree et al.’s (2009) variable. The nine region variable coincided almost 
exclusively to the five region variable except that it separated Europe into Eastern and Western, Americas 
was separated into Latin and North America, and three subcategories of Asia were present instead of one. 
Nonetheless, little is lost by using the five region variable. Cyprus was, however, recoded into the Middle 
East region over the initial Europe region code.   
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to authorities, and it indexes other forms of violence.” Although there are several sources 
of international crime data, this study uses data taken from the World Health 
Organization (WHO). The WHO collects national statistics for nearly 200 countries and 
territories on 70 core health indicators (http://www.who.int), however annual historical 
coverage for all countries is not as consistent and severely limited. Homicide data from 
the WHO are generally considered among the most reliable measures of cross-national 
homicide (see LaFree, 1999) and it measures the number of deaths due to homicides per 
100,000 people within a country’s population. A lagged measure of homicide rates was 
included in the time ordered cross-sectional analysis, but not the pooled contemporaneous 
cross-sectional analysis of domestic terrorism.22   
An alternative measure of cultural violence includes involvement in a recent 
major war and the Political Terror Scale (PTS). Mullins and Young (2009) argue that the 
PTS (originally collected by Amnesty International and U.S. State Department Country 
Reports) captures cultural violence because it measures the level (severity) and scope of 
state sanctioned abuses towards civilians (e.g., political imprisonment, disappearances, 
torture, and killings). The PTS scale measures state sanctioned abuses on a 5 point scale 
and has been validated with other pre-existing scales of abuses by the state (see Mullins 
& Young, 2009; Gibney & Dalton, 1996).  
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Due to the operationalization and broad definition of terrorism employed by the GTD, there is a 
possibility for overlap of homicide (an independent variable) and domestic terrorism counts (the outcome 
variable) in the contemporaneous analysis.  
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Analytical strategy 
Bivariate analyses 
 Using the incident level and the country level database, a series of correlation 
matrices were generated for the pooled sample of countries displaying bivariate 
correlations between all of the variables included in the model. Additionally, using the 
incident level data base, similar correlation matrices were generated for each country 
included in the analysis. In addition to the variables already specified, these matrices also 
include the non-transformed outcome (counts of domestic terrorism), as well as the 
number of total events and transnational events for descriptive purposes.  
A series of diagnostics to detect problematic multi-collinearity between the 
predictor variables were also conducted. If high multi-collinearity exists, estimation 
produces large standard errors for slope coefficients, and produces unreliable estimates 
(Lewis-Beck, 1980). In addition to examining a correlation matrix for correlations .80 or 
greater, a common test of multi-collinearity is to regress each independent variable on all 
other independent variables (Berry & Feldman, 1985; Lewis-Beck, 1980). If the 
explained variance (R2) is close to 1.00 in any of these analyses then high multi-
collinearity is present. Lewis-Beck (1980) states that the largest R2 value obtained is an 
indicator of the degree of multi-collinearity present in the model.  
Results from these diagnostic tests indicated that although many of the variables 
are highly correlated with each other, multi-collinearity is particularly problematic as it 
pertains to economic inequality (GINI) and decommodification (R2 = 0.701). The 
correlation between GINI and decommodification (r = -0.837, Table 6) exceeds the 
threshold suggested by conventional multi-collinearity diagnostics.  Additionally, VIF 
(variance inflation factor) statistics from the full model indicated that with 
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decommodification included, VIF’s were well over the standard convention of 4 (e.g., 
15.216).23 As a result, the decommodification variable was taken out of the analysis. A 
previously proposed region variable was also deleted for the lack of variation across the 
sample of countries.24   
Multivariate analyses 
Short and long-term cross-sectional analyses. 
This study uses a series of short and long term contemporaneous and time ordered 
cross-sectional analyses to examine the associations between structural and cultural 
variables and average levels of terrorism across countries. Using averages of all the 
variables for the entire 27 year time span (1970-1997), I conducted a contemporaneous 
cross-sectional analysis, regressing the average domestic terrorism level on all predictor 
variables. A series of reduced models culminating in a full model with all co-variates 
included was also conducted to examine the possibility of suppression effects (addition of 
control variable results in a previously non-significant variable becoming significant), 
mediation effects, as well as high collinearity between the predictor variables (Berry & 
Feldman, 1985). The long-term contemporaneous cross-sectional analysis allowed me to 
examine the overall relationship between the predictor variables and domestic terrorism 
across the sample of countries for the 27 year time span.   
                                                          
23
 Results from the diagnostics are available upon request.  
24
 By reducing the scope to only include developed countries, variation in region outside of the three largest 
categories (i.e., Americas, Europe, and Northern Africa/Middle East) is relatively nonexistent. Whereas, 
region as a control variable was initially included, it was later taken out because it failed to add much 
substance to the regression models. It would be more beneficial as a variable with a broader research design 
that might include a larger number of countries across the economic spectrum.   
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A major drawback of this approach, however, is that it assumes that the pooled 
time span (27 years) indeed reflects one period in time (one contiguous stable period), 
thus it assumes that the independent and dependent variables are relatively stable within 
this time period. As Menard (1991) notes this is a set of assumptions that are often 
untenable, especially with longer time spans; the assumption that all of the measurements 
are stable across the time span becomes less plausible. Following the approach of 
Messner et al. (2002), I examined the robustness of this assumption and the results 
obtained from the long term contemporaneous cross-sectional analysis by conducting a 
set of similar analyses on 3 shorter intervals of time consisting of approximately 7 to 11 
years each: 1970 to 1979 (10); 1980 to 1990 (11); 1991 to 1997 (7). These time periods 
were chosen on the basis of prior research regarding the effects of certain structural 
variables on homicide (Messner et al., 2002; Savolainen, 2000), and are referred to as the 
short-term contemporaneous cross-sectional analyses. All analyses were conducted using 
all of the available data for all countries during each given time period, and sensitivity 
tests using a corresponding listwise deletion sample was also conducted. This resulted in 
a series of long and short-term contemporaneous cross-sectional analyses that cover the 
entire 1970-1997 period, as well as sub-intervals of time.25  
All of the contemporaneous analyses examined the direct effects of the structural 
and cultural variables on overall levels of domestic terrorism in the short and long term. 
For example, this study examines if a country’s level of development is statistically 
correlated with levels of domestic terrorism during a given time period, net of other 
relevant structural and cultural correlates. Prior literature also indicates that many of the 
                                                          
25
 Additional sensitivity analyses were conducted to examine robustness of findings to outliers and changes 
in geographic boundaries over time (e.g., Former USSR countries).  
44 
 
 
 
structural and cultural correlates used in the current study potentially have causal 
relationships with domestic terrorism. Although the current study uses longitudinal data, 
it does not use a time series analysis and as a result is unable to establish temporal 
ordering and causality. An alternative approach that would allow for full maximization of 
the data would be some type of longitudinal analysis such as a pooled time series analysis 
or multi-level analysis (Gartner, 1990; Pampel & Gartner 1995; LaFree & Tseloni, 2006; 
Mullins & Young, 2009).   
 A less sophisticated but related statistical approach that may shed some light on 
the issue of causality and temporal ordering is a time ordered cross-sectional analysis, 
which is a cross-sectional analysis that includes lagged independent variables (Menard, 
1991). The next section briefly describes the analysis for this stage of the proposed 
analytic strategy. 
Short and long-term time ordered cross-sectional analyses. 
 In this stage of the analysis, all of the independent variables were lagged in time 
prior to the domestic terrorism outcome. Using the data from 1970 to 1990, all of the 
aforementioned predictor variables were averaged over time, and used to predict 
subsequent levels of domestic terrorism (1991-1997). Multiple regression techniques 
were also used in this portion of the analysis, as well as a series of reduced and full 
models. Next, to test the robustness of the time ordered cross-sectional results over 
shorter or different historical periods, a similar analysis was conducted using a different 
time span. Averages of the all the predictor variables were created using data from 1991 
to 1994 to predict average levels of domestic terrorism for the period 1995 to 1997. 
Slicing the data in this manner may allow for an inspection of the robustness of the 
45 
 
 
 
findings generated from the earlier analysis, and it also allows for an examination of the 
relationship between structural/cultural variables and domestic terrorism among 
transitional countries (e.g., Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). All of the aforementioned 
sensitivity tests used both pairwise and listwise deleted data sets and checks for outliers.  
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CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS 
  
Figure 1 presents the distribution of total terrorism attacks for the entire twenty-
seven year time span (1993 was excluded due to lost data from the original source). The 
data include 33,399 total attacks, 19,886 domestic attacks, and 3,373 transnational 
attacks. Adding the domestic with the transnational attacks does not total 33,399 due to 
the fact that 10,140 ambiguous cases were excluded from Mullins and Young’s (2009) 
domestic/transnational coding. The overall trend shows a dramatic increase from the 
early 1970s until a sharp decline following 1992 (the highest point). Three prominent 
peaks are present around 1979, 1984, and 1992 for both domestic and total attacks. 
Transnational attacks remained relatively stable throughout 1970 to 1997 with minor 
increases around 1976 and 1991. The percent change score for the entire time period was 
a 758% increase in domestic terrorism, a 53% increase in transnational terrorism, and a 
545% increase in total attacks from 1970 to 1997. It should be noted that these increases 
may in part be due to advancements in the data collection process. Nevertheless, the 
percent change from the lowest year recorded (1972) to the highest peak (1992) was 
2,250% increase for domestic, 487% increase for transnational, and 1,907% increase in 
total attacks. Total attacks recorded in 1972 were a mere 134 compared to 1992’s peak of 
2,689 total attacks. All three peaks were followed by a relative decline.  
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Figure 1 
 
Distribution of Total Terrorism, 1970-1997 
 
Domestic attacks by region were examined within the geographical boundaries of 
Europe (35 nations), North Africa/Middle East (11 nations), Sub Africa (1 nation), Asia 
(8 nations), and the Americas (17 nations) (see Figure 2). Above the bar graph is the total 
number of domestic terrorism attacks within that region for the entire time span. The 
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Americas has a disproportionately higher number of total domestic attacks (10,111) even 
though it has eighteen fewer countries than Europe. This is partially attributed to smaller 
sized countries making up most of the 35 European nations, as well as some outliers 
within Latin America (i.e., Colombia (3,271) and Peru’s (3,469) total domestic attacks 
from 1970 to 1997, see Table 2). Sub Africa is represented with one nation (Mauritius) 
that met the criteria of inclusion of developed countries according to the Human 
Development Report (2009). 
Figure 2 
 
 
Total Domestic Attacks by Region, 1970-1997 
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Descriptive statistics were separated into two tables based on the use of an 
incident level and country level data set (see Tables 3 & 4). Among the incident level 
descriptive statistics, sample sizes fluctuate from 311 country-year observations for the 
economic inequality variable to 1797 country-year observations for the three 
measurements of terrorism. These sample size variations are mirrored in the country level 
table as well (N ranges from 37 to 72).  
Table 3  
 
Descriptives for Developed Nations, 1970-1997 (Incident Level)  
Variable  N     Mean    Median  Std. Deviation          Min    Max 
Domestic Terrorism 1797 11.07 0.00 36.62 0.00 404.00 
Transnational Terrorism 1797 1.88 0.00 5.13 0.00 70.00 
Total Terrorism 1797 18.59 1.00 57.63 0.00 548.00 
Economic Development        1405 10277.23 7550.63 8795.92 113.52 54239.26 
Economic Inequality 311 31.39 30.34 6.96 19.60 53.34 
Decommodification   1036 0.58 0.21 1.95 -2.16 4.62 
Democracy  1664 0.64 0.89 0.39 0.00 0.98 
Ethnic Fractionalization        1607 0.25 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.75 
Population (log) 1586 9.23 9.19 1.59 5.40 14.02 
Sex Ratio (m per 100f)  1325 98.01 97.41 6.66 85.46 159.58 
Percent Population 15-29 1323 24.68 24.13 3.18 14.47 34.68 
Homicide Rate per 100k 1337 4.40 1.79 8.12 0.00 87.75 
Recent War 1791 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Political Terror Scale 1281 2.10 2.00 1.12 1.00 5.00 
Transitional Nation 1797 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 
 
 
 A number of interesting findings are prevalent in the aggregate descriptives from 
Table 4. Specific to the measures of terrorism, the average number of domestic terrorism 
events for the countries in the sample is 10.05. The median is 1.21 events. This indicates 
that the data is skewed, and suggests the presence of extreme outliers. Likewise, the total 
terrorism measure reports a 16.91 mean, a 2.21 median, and a 193.25 range. Domestic 
terrorism has a skewness of 3.579 while total terrorism is skewed at 3.290. This indicates 
that modeling techniques that rest on the assumption of normality may not be appropriate. 
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Implications of this are discussed in the conclusion. The distribution of the homicide rate 
is also skewed (4.249) with a mean of 4.53, a 1.83 median, and a 48.36 range.   
 
Table 4 
 
Descriptives for Developed Nations, 1970-1997 (Country Level) 
Variable      N      Mean     Median    Std. Deviation        Min    Max 
Domestic Terrorism 72 10.05             1.21 22.79    0.00 123.89 
Transnational Terrorism 72 1.76               0.46 2.84  0.00 10.39 
Total Terrorism 72 16.91 2.21 36.83  0.00 193.25 
Economic Development        62 9051.07         5493.93 8179.42           289.47    33549.44 
Economic Inequality 37 32.41               31.17 7.40             20.77          52.55 
Decommodification   37 0.58 0.21    1.97 -2.16 4.62 
Democracy  68 0.65               0.79 0.32  0.00 0.97 
Ethnic Fractionalization        65 0.27   0.24 0.20  0.00 0.75 
Population (log) 64 9.10 9.08    1.55    5.96 13.84 
Sex Ratio (m per 100f)  62 98.39 97.56 8.61 86.58 142.55 
Percent Population 15-29 62 24.77 24.06 2.93 19.41 32.40 
Homicide Rate per 100k 62 4.53 1.83 7.13                0.00 48.36 
Political Terror Scale 70 2.06 1.86 0.98 1.00 4.40 
Transitional Nation 72 0.15 0.00 0.36 0.00 1.00 
 
Correlation matrices are in Tables 5 and 6 using pairwise deletion. Listwise 
deleted correlation matrices are presented in Tables 1 and 2 in Appendix B. Among the 
correlations in Table 5 for the incident level data set, it is logical to see higher 
correlations between economic inequality and decommodification (r = 0.652), as well as 
decommodification and economic development (r = -0.728). Countries with social 
welfare spending plans in place may reduce the financial inequalities among its 
population, often times these are wealthier societies. All of the correlations described 
above were significant at the .01 level. 
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Table 5 
Correlation Matrix for Incident Level of Developed Nations, 1970-1997 (Pairwise deletion)
Variable
1.   Domestic Terrorism 1.000
2.   Transnational Terrorism .526 ** 1.000
3.   Total Terrorism .978 ** .589 ** 1.000
4.   Economic Development        -.104 ** -.080 ** -.107 ** 1.000
5.   Economic Inequality .126 * .065 .110 -.231 ** 1.000
6.   Decommodification  -.154 ** -.041 -.153 ** .652 ** -.728 ** 1.000
7.   Democracy .131 ** .161 ** .147 ** .289 ** -.144 * .425 ** 1.000
8.   Ethnic Fractionalization        .037 -.018 .029 -.074 ** .257 ** -.223 ** .069 ** 1.000
9.   Population (log) .247 ** .268 ** .260 ** .172 ** .413 ** .044 -.105 ** -.092 ** 1.000
10. Sex Ratio (m per 100 f) -.043 -.053 -.046 -.002 .058 -.311 ** -.233 ** -.038 -.299 ** 1.000
11. % Population 15-29 .002 -.041 -.009 -.377 ** .432 ** -.598 ** -.214 ** .089 ** -.167 ** .401 ** 1.000
12. Homicide Rate per 100k .349 ** .189 ** .370 ** -.314 ** .588 ** -.396 ** -.065 * .004 .223 ** -.080 ** .206 ** 1.000
13. Recent War -.004 .015 -.007 .014 .113 * -.001 .011 -.007 .122 ** .001 -.007 -.028 1.000
14. Political Terror Scale .340 ** .220 ** .348 ** -.524 ** .393 ** -.533 ** -.462 ** -.039 .239 ** .133 ** .256 ** .434 ** -.006 1.000
Significance levels * ≤ .05. ** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
  11   12   13   14  6   7   8   9   10  1   2   3   4   5
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Table 6 is the correlation matrix for the country level data set. Most all of the 
variables are significantly correlated in the hypothesized direction. For example, 
decommodification is highly and significantly correlated to a majority of other variables 
such as with economic inequality (r = -0.837), percent of the population aged 15-29  
(r = -0.738), economic development (r = 0.684), political terror scale (r = -0.614), and 
democracy (r = 0.543). The political terror scale is moderately correlated with economic 
development (r = -0.548), economic inequality (r = 0.515), and democracy (r = -0.546). 
All of these correlations were significant at the .01 level.  
Based on the literature review, I expected a number of empirical associations 
between terrorism and the development based measures (i.e., GDP, GINI, 
decommodification, and democracy). Although economic development, 
decommodification, and economic inequality were all in the expected direction, 
economic inequality was the only variable that was significant (P < .05) and showed a 
moderate association (r = 0.358). Economic inequality was significantly correlated (r = 
0.358, P < .01) with domestic terrorism, as well (r = 0.316, P < .05) with transnational 
terrorism, and (r = 0.349, P < .01) with total terrorism. This lends support to Koch and 
Cranmer’s (2007) findings that the dispersion of wealth within a country, measured by 
the GINI coefficient, is positive and significantly associated with terrorism. Lastly, pre-
existing violence, measured by homicide rates and a political terror scale, and logged 
population all have positive associations with terrorism that are significant. The Pearson 
coefficients for the pre-existing violence variables are consistently around .4 to .45 for all 
three terrorism outcomes except for homicide rate and transnational terrorism. Similarly, 
the logged population variable is correlated with domestic terrorism (r = 0.317, P < .05),
53 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6
Correlation Matrix for Country Level of Developed Nations, 1970-1997 (Pairwise deletion)
Variable
1.   Domestic Terrorism 1.000
2.   Transnational Terrorism .745 ** 1.000
3.   Total Terrorism .992 ** .773 ** 1.000
4.   Economic Development        
-.108 -.090 -.112 1.000
5.   Economic Inequality .358 ** .316 * .349 ** -.346 * 1.000
6.   Decommodification  
-.234 -.077 -.226 .684 ** -.837 ** 1.000
7.   Democracy .081 .119 .096 .315 * -.308 * .543 ** 1.000
8.   Ethnic Fractionalization        .022 -.041 .011 -.167 .143 -.229 .096 1.000
9.   Population (log) .317 * .458 ** .324 ** .129 .002 .049 -.149 -.187 1.000
10. Sex Ratio (m per 100 f) 
-.019 -.075 -.022 .115 .314 * -.325 -.358 ** -.088 -.261 1.000
11. % Population 15-29 .115 -.050 .108 -.333 * .645 ** -.738 ** -.319 * .000 -.051 .596 ** 1.000
12. Homicide Rate per 100k .395 ** .238 .401 ** -.313 * .467 ** -.439 ** -.133 -.010 .237 -.132 .175 1.000
13. Political Terror Scale .449 ** .422 ** .454 ** -.548 ** .515 ** -.614 ** -.546 ** -.022 .252 * .233 .373 ** .358 ** 1.000
Significance levels * ≤ .05. ** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
1 2 3 4 5 11 12 136 7 8 9 10
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transnational terrorism (r = 0.458, P < .01), and total terrorism (r = 0.324, P < .01).          
Walker and Madden (2009, p.228) make it a point to clarify that “correlation does 
not equal causation.” They argue that empirical association is necessary to support a 
causality argument but is often only the starting point. Regression models follow in order 
to support or contest previous arguments. Using listwise deletion reduced the sample size 
dramatically. Given the type of missing data in the current study, Allison (2002) 
considers pairwise deletion advantageous because it maximizes the use of available non-
missing cases. In light of this, tables 7 through 11 use pairwise deletion. All of these 
models were also estimated using listwise deletion. Those subsequent tables are found in 
Appendix B. 
Multivariate analysis 
Table 7 presents results from the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the 
entire twenty-seven year time span on domestic terrorism. As previously noted, 
decommodification created a multi-collinearity issue with the model; therefore it was 
taken out of the regression analysis. As predictor variables are added from model A to 
model E, the percent of variance in the dependent variable the model explains increases 
from nearly 11% to almost 43% in the entire model. Population was also positively 
related to terrorism across all models.26 Countries with larger populations are the targets 
of more domestic terrorism. Hypothesis 1, that a country’s level of economic 
development would be associated with more domestic terrorism, was inconclusive in 
direction and lacked significance. Hypothesis 2 was supported in direction and 
significance. A one-unit increase in a country’s GINI coefficient leads to a 0.964 increase 
                                                          
26
 Multi-collinearity issues associated with adding certain variables into the model, mainly PTS, impacted 
the estimates for other variables, such as the lack of significance for population in Table 7 model E. 
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in domestic terrorism. The addition of one of the cultural violence measures (political 
terror) decreased the economic inequality coefficient from 0.964 to 0.555. However, 
hypothesis 5 which asserted that stronger democracies would be negatively related to 
their level of domestic terrorism was unfounded in direction (b = 21.229 and 32.622) but 
statistically significant at the .01 level.  
 
Table 8 presents results using the same predictor variables to examine domestic 
terrorism at three different time points, and the entire span time (1970 to 1997) with two 
key outlying countries removed. Again, the population variable was statistically 
significant (P < .01) and positively associated with domestic terrorism across nearly all 
Table 7 
Regression Analysis for Long Term Pooled Sample (Pairwise deletion)
Population (log) 4.466 ** 4.659 ** 4.365 ** 4.999 *** 2.233
(1.740) (1.796) (1.780) (1.738) (1.819)
Ethnic Fractionalization 9.544 7.172 3.341 -1.601 1.242
(14.616) (15.175) (15.085) (14.695) (13.474)
Economic Development 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(Centered) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Inequality 0.802 ** 0.964 *** 0.555 *
(Centered) (0.323) (0.320) (0.320)
Democracy 21.229 ** 32.622 ***
(Centered) (9.817) (9.692)
Political Terror Scale 13.898 ***
(Centered) (4.447)
N 63 62 55 55 55
R2 0.107 0.127 0.230 0.303 0.429
Adj. R2 0.075 0.076 0.163 0.225 0.351
Constant omitted from tables.
Unstandardized B coefficients on top line, standard errors in parentheses. 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
Significance levels * ≤ .10. ** ≤ 05. *** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
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models. Democracy and the political terror variables were the only two significant 
findings in the 1980’s and 1990’s. For both time periods, an increase in strength of a 
democracy (measured as a scale) and a higher recorded amount of political terror both 
lead to increases in the amount of domestic terrorism at the country level.  
 
The final two columns in Table 8 display results from model D and E of Table 7, 
except that the two prominent outliers of Colombia and Peru were excluded.27 These two 
countries account for nearly 34% of the total domestic terrorism cases in the entire data 
set. The R2 value for the final outlier removed model (0.308) is only slightly higher than 
Table 7 model D (0.303). Once more, economic inequality (b = 0.433), democracy (b = 
                                                          
27
 I did not establish an empirical justification or threshold for choosing outliers. 
Table 8
Short-Term Cross-Sectional Analysis and Outliers (Pairwise deletion)
Population (log) 4.384 ** -2.896 1.661 2.682 ** 3.628 ***
(1.596) (3.792) (2.432) (1.117) (1.012)
Ethnic Fractionalization -1.458 23.734 4.933 -2.809
-3.816
(12.537) (28.503) (18.026) (8.584) (8.789)
Economic Development 8.532 0.001 0.001 0.000
-7.498
(Centered) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Inequality 0.393 0.142 0.317 0.320 0.433 **
(Centered) (0.327) (0.665) (0.448) (0.199) (0.193)
Democracy 13.381 59.987 *** 30.060 ** 18.607 *** 13.545 **
(Centered) (8.030) (18.627) (12.173) (6.290) (5.779)
Political Terror Scale 0.490 39.774 *** 15.644 *** 5.273 *
(Centered) (3.535) (9.748) (5.100) (2.917)
N 28 38 51 53 53
R2 0.405 0.506 0.399 0.358 0.308
Adj. R2 0.181 0.396 0.306 0.266 0.228
Outliers Removed
1970-1997
1970-1997 models have Colombia and Peru excluded.
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Outliers Removed
Constant omitted from tables.
Unstandardized B coefficients on top line, standard errors in parentheses. 
1970-1979 1980-1990 1991-1997 1970-1997
Significance levels * ≤ .10. ** ≤ 05. *** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
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13.545), and population (b = 3.628) are positive and significant (P < .01).  Where again, 
an increase in economic inequality was associated with more domestic terrorism 
(hypothesis 2) across the entire time span minus the outliers.  
In an effort to examine causation, Tables 9 presents the regression analysis of the 
predictor variables in 1970-1990 for domestic terrorism incidents during 1991-1997. 
Country level homicide rates were added as a secondary measure (to PTS) of cultural 
violence. Initially, homicide was not included in the contemporaneous analysis because 
there are likely overlap with the outcome variable, in particular those domestic terrorism 
incidents that resulted in a fatality. The PTS potentially has the same issue. The coding of 
the PTS, as described by Gidney and Dalton (1996), does not rule out the possibility that 
homicide numbers might be recounted as part of a country’s PTS value. Models E 
through G in Table 9 are the complete models with either lagged measures of homicide or 
PTS included/excluded or both, noting that the cultural violence measures were merely 
included as controls and were not the focus of the analysis (i.e., economic development, 
inequality, and democracy). Youthful population percentage and sex ratio, which were 
also excluded from the contemporaneous analysis due to multi-collinearity, were added 
as additional population control variables to see if the earlier population findings could be 
disaggregated.  
Table 9 reports an initial jump (34%) in percentage of variation explained by the 
inclusion of homicide rates and the political terror measure (PTS). Among this table, a 
one-unit increase in a country’s homicide rate leads to a 2.340 increase in domestic 
terrorism. This was robust across all models. The political terror variable was also  
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positive and significant (P < .01) across all models. Economic development again failed 
to be significant in any model. As in the contemporaneous models, democracy is 
positively related to terrorism. Democracy, which was initially inferred to be a more 
responsive avenue to relieve strain, is actually associated with more domestic terrorism 
among these models (all significant). Model G in Table 9 is the complete model without 
cultural violence measures. This model again presents positive and significant 
coefficients for population and the democracy scale. It is a key finding to see that the 
Table 9
1970-1990 Predictors of 1991-1997 Domestic Terrorism (Pairwise deletion)
Population (log) 5.572 ** 0.915 0.242 -0.032 0.148 1.001 6.737 **
(2.480) (2.277) (2.574) (2.985) (2.537) (2.872) (2.828)
% Population Aged 15-29 0.276 -2.851 * -2.466 -1.845 -1.574 -1.214
-1.935
(Centered) (1.658) (1.472) (1.634) (2.009) (1.709) (1.942) (2.298)
Sex Ratio (m per 100 f) -0.026 0.063 -0.124 -0.061 0.421 0.043 0.799
(Centered) (0.588) (0.496) (0.589) (0.683) (0.598) (0.666) (0.750)
Ethnic Fractionalization 10.839 20.417 20.305 23.601 10.517 0.968 0.279
(22.356) (18.055) (18.669) (21.852) (18.962) (21.299) (25.345)
Homicide 2.366 *** 2.342 *** 2.718 *** 2.340 ***
(0.672) (0.696) (0.906) (0.778)
Political Terror Scale 10.517 ** 13.145 ** 13.737 * 21.159 *** 25.170 ***
(Centered) (4.338) (6.055) (7.017) (6.352) (7.076)
Economic Development 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-0.001
(Centered) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Inequality -0.532 -0.495 0.209 0.583
(Centered) (0.595) (0.506) (0.511) (0.595)
Democracy 43.215 *** 48.746 *** 32.013 *
(Centered) (12.790) (14.421) (16.222)
N 52 52 52 40 40 40 40
R2 0.114 0.456 0.462 0.477 0.637 0.510 0.281
Adj. R2 0.030 0.374 0.360 0.322 0.511 0.365 0.101
Model GModel F
Transitional nations excluded. 
Constant omitted from tables.
Unstandardized B coefficients on top line, standard errors in parentheses. 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
Significance levels * ≤ .10. ** ≤ 05. *** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
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democracy effect remains even after the cultural violence variables are withdrawn. 
However, the population measure is insignificant in models E and F (including the 
cultural variables), then becomes significant once these variables are taken out of the 
analysis. Problems with multi-collinearity between the cultural violence measures could 
be the cause of these inconsistencies. It should be noted that the exclusions of homicide 
and PTS reduced the R2 value from 0.637 to 0.281.28  
Table 10 presents the regression analysis of 1991-1994 independent variables for 
1995-1997 domestic terrorism. Again, there in an increase in R2 value (0.55) by including 
the cultural violence control variables. Similar to the previous table, Table 10 reports 
positive and significant coefficients for homicide across all models. Higher country 
populations are again, associated with more domestic terrorism in the reduced model A 
through model D.29 However, within the complete models F and G (one includes PTS and 
the other does not), population’s significance drops out. Only the PTS measure (b = 
12.002) has significance among the complete models. Democracy had to this point 
                                                          
28
 There are drawbacks to using R2 as a sole indicator of model fit. The significance present in all F-tests 
expressed that the probability that the results of the models did not happen by chance. R2 values were 
referred to for the strength of the overall model. Walker and Madden (2009, p.280) identify the R2 value as 
“the proportion of variation in the dependent variable associated with variation in the independent 
variables.” The adjusted R2 corrects for the number of cases where smaller case numbers relative to the 
number of variables can inflate the R2 value upward. Also, the coefficient of determination (R2) value 
increases with the number of regressors that are included. R2 struggles to be used as a comparison between 
models that have a different amount of predictor variables. This is obvious in Tables 9 and 10 when 
comparing models that include pre-existing violence measures with models that do not. Comparing the F-
tests between models is more appropriate.  
29
 Model E was plagued by extreme multi-collinearity and subsequently removed from Table 10. The 
percent of the variation in the dependent variable being explained in this model was abnormally high (R2 = 
0.910). The correlation between homicide rates in the early 1990s with domestic terrorism from 1995-1997 
was very high (r = 0.802), while the model had multiple variables above the acceptable level for variance 
inflation factors and below the tolerance. Multi-collinearity within this model caused a lack of confidence 
in the findings of model E. The reduction in variables of model G (mainly homicide) reduced all VIFs 
closer to an acceptable number (i.e., 4).  
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remained significant among all tables, but was found to be null for the 1990s. 
Democracies in the 1990s could be different than in previous decades, or components 
within democracies such as the constraints on political power could be causing some of 
the findings. 
Table 10
1991-1994 Predictors of 1995-1997 Domestic Terrorism (Pairwise deletion)
Population (log) 5.169 ** 4.893 *** 4.350 ** 6.802 ** -0.135 4.434
(2.233) (1.589) (1.932) (2.492) (4.035) (3.306)
% Population Aged 15-29 2.358 * -0.817 -0.715 0.997 -0.220 1.300
(Centered) (1.329) (0.962) (1.012) (1.432) (2.812) (2.795)
Sex Ratio (m per 100 f) -0.379 0.502 0.431 0.782 * -0.719 -0.265
(Centered) (0.528) (0.340) (0.376) (0.455) (0.718) (0.701)
Ethnic Fractionalization 2.455 -1.136 -0.896 17.902 -17.571 -10.858
(18.842) (11.242) (11.633) (16.177) (26.875) (27.697)
Homicide 1.904 *** 1.890 *** 2.210 ***
(0.220) (0.229) (0.303)
Political Terror Scale -3.036 -1.914 -4.329 12.002 *
(Centered) (3.164) (3.888) (4.491) (6.528)
Economic Development 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(Centered) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Inequality -1.010 * 0.789 0.729
(Centered) (0.525) (0.844) (0.877)
Democracy 13.364 16.176
(Centered) (18.372) (19.045)
N 55 55 55 42 42 42
R2 0.173 0.730 0.732 0.763 0.327 0.246
Adj. R2 0.098 0.691 0.684 0.695 0.135 0.064
Model GModel F
Russia and Czechoslovakia excluded. 
Constant omitted from tables.
Unstandardized B coefficients on top line, standard errors in parentheses. 
Model A Model B Model C Model D
Significance levels * ≤ .10. ** ≤ 05. *** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
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An alternative approach was to conduct a separate regression analysis using the 
separated democracy variables that were initially used in Gates et al.’s (2006) Scalar 
Index of Polities measure. This was done specifically to examine the components of a 
democracy and to tackle hypothesis 5 which states that more restrictions on executive 
decision-making power will lead to increased domestic terrorism. The findings for this 
are presented as Table 11.  
 
Table 11
Regression Analysis of Democracy Variables (Pairwise deletion)
Predictors
Domestic Terrorism
Population (log) 4.589 ** 6.031 ** 4.060
(1.880) (2.824) (3.142)
% Population Aged 15-29 -1.739 -1.821 0.913
(Centered) (1.629) (2.344) (2.538)
Sex Ratio (m per 100 f) 0.575 0.758
-0.243
(Centered) (0.500) (0.779) (0.701)
Ethnic Fractionalization -3.855 -0.752 -13.220
(15.233) (26.176) (26.840)
Executive Constraints 3.547 * 4.560 2.473
(1.795) (2.770) (2.707)
Economic Development -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(Centered) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Inequality 1.131 *** 0.628 0.818
(Centered) (0.409) (0.608) (0.822)
N 55 40 42
R2 0.310 0.253 0.249
Adj. R2 0.198 0.067 0.067
1991-1994
1995-1997
1970-1990
1991-1997
1970-1997
1970-1997
Unstandardized B coefficients on top line, standard errors in parentheses. 
Constant omitted from tables.
Russia and Czechoslovakia excluded from 1991-1994 predictors of 1995-1997 domestic terrorism. 
Transitional nations excluded from 1970-1990 predictors of 1991-1997 domestic terrorism. 
Significance levels * ≤ .10. ** ≤ 05. *** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
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These models are similar to the complete models found in Tables 7, 9, and 10 
except that the democracy scale is replaced with Gibney and Dalton’s (1996) executive 
constraint measure.30 Higher executive constraints were hypothesized to cause more 
frustration due to an inability to pass legislation thus leading to more domestic terrorism. 
All models reported a positive association between more executive constraints and the 
amount of domestic terrorism. However, only the contemporaneous model (1970-1997) 
was significant (P < .10). Within this same model, an increase of one-unit in the GINI 
coefficient leads to a country level increase in domestic terrorism of 1.131 (P < .01). The 
highest percent of variation explained (R2 = 0.310) is also seen in the contemporaneous 
model. Lastly, population is yet again positive and significantly associated with domestic 
terrorism. A discussion of the potential meaning behind many of these findings follows in 
the concluding chapter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 The executive constraints measure was chosen on the basis of Li’s (2005) findings that institutional or 
government constraints promoted transnational terrorism. The other five components to Gates et al.’s 
(2006) Scalar Index of Polities measure should not theoretically promote more terrorism.   
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this thesis was to answer two questions. First, do prior established 
predictors of criminal violence (i.e., economy, inequality, social welfare, political 
orientation, ethnic fractionalization, population, and pre-existing violence) also predict 
domestic terrorism at the country level? Second, is the relationship between these macro-
structural and cultural variables in the same direction as found in the previously 
published work? In an effort to use criminological methods and to narrow the focus to 
domestic terrorism only, I used the Global Terrorism Database along with other data sets, 
to examine these issues among 72 developed countries between 1970 and 1997.  
  The findings from both the descriptive and multivariate regression analyses 
provide mixed results for the relationship between structural correlates of cross-national 
violence and domestic terrorism. For example, a number of control variables established 
in prior literature (i.e., ethnic fractionalization, sex ratio, and youthful population 
percentage) did not achieve statistical significance in the current study, whereas the 
population variable was significant across nearly all models. Thus, although overall 
population of a country was significantly related to overall levels of terrorism, the size of 
the youthful population was not, nor was the ratio of men to women. This implies that the 
sheer volume of people of a population increases the probability of a country 
experiencing a larger number of domestic terrorism events. More people may equate to 
more individuals willing to commit acts of terrorism and more available targets. This was 
suggested by Mullins and Young (2009) and Burgoon (2006) while being supported 
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across the board in other works (Koch & Cranmer, 2007; Li, 2005; Li & Schaub, 2004; 
Wade & Reiter, 2007). Similarly, the five hypotheses and the cultural violence measures 
had notable findings as well.  
Hypothesis One 
Consistent findings for economic development, measured as GDP per capita, 
emerged across both contemporaneous and lagged analyses— a country’s level of GDP 
does not appear to be statistically associated to domestic terrorism. Though there are a 
number of theoretical explanations expecting both a positive and negative relationship 
between economic development and cross-national homicide rates (i.e., modernization 
and civilizing perspectives), results from this study indicated a consistently null 
relationship between GDP and domestic terrorism. One potential reason for this null 
finding is the measurement of economic development (GDP per capita) used in the 
current study. GDP is a frequently used measure of economic development; however 
other researchers have also used other indicators to create an index of economic 
development (Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Messner et al., 2002). Perhaps including a 
more multi-dimensional index of development would better capture the concept and any 
potential effects of economic development on domestic terrorism. Additionally, it is 
important to note that modernization perspectives would advocate for a measure of 
economic development that captures rate of change rather than overall, thus future 
research should also include a measure of rapid economic development.  
Hypothesis Two 
The effect of economic inequality (GINI), however, was much more consistent 
with prior research on the causes of cross-national violence. Particularly, a positive 
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relationship between economic inequality and domestic terrorism was found in both the 
long-term and short-term contemporaneous analyses. Countries with higher levels of 
economic inequality are more likely to experience domestic terrorism events compared to 
those countries with lower levels of economic inequality. This is consistent with recent 
criminological research which finds strong cross-sectional effects of income inequality on 
homicide rates across countries (Messner et al., 2002).  
The time-ordered analyses, however, provided much less consistent and 
supportive evidence for the effects of economic inequality on domestic terrorism. 
Messner et al. (2002) posits that researchers often disregard the quality of the GINI 
measure in order to maximize their sample sizes, thus enhancing representativeness and 
statistical power. However, Messner et al. (2002) found inequality’s positive association 
with homicide to be robust in all cross-sectional analysis regardless of the quality of the 
GINI measure, but only the low-quality GINI variable (which increased sample size) was 
significant in their longitudinal analysis. Messner et al. (2002, p.393) acknowledges that 
“more developed nations are disproportionately represented in the longitudinal analysis, 
and these are the nations with the most advanced social welfare systems, that is, nations 
for which the criminogenic effects of income inequality are likely to be mitigated.” I 
chose to use only highest quality GINI measure in my model, which reduced the sample 
size (n = 37) to a much lower number compared to other variables. This likely contributes 
to the lack of significance for inequality in the time-ordered analysis.   
Hypothesis Three 
Due to a multi-collinearity issue, this study was unable to examine the 
relationship between decommodification and domestic terrorism in the regression 
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analyses. I do know however, that decommodification is significantly related to economic 
inequality (GINI), and GINI is significantly related to domestic terrorism. The correlation 
between decommodification and terrorism is negative for the country and incident level, 
while only significant at the incident level (r = -0.154 with domestic terrorism, r = -0.153 
with total terrorism). Future researchers should continue to explore decommodification as 
it relates to terrorism. A longitudinal analysis would be more suitable for reducing the 
collinearity problems between the predictor variables.    
Hypothesis Four 
Grievances form when the physical and material needs of societal members are 
not met by their government. Rosenfeld and Messner (2006b) speculate that an anomic 
culture born out the institutional imbalance of power, anomie and strain may arise when 
goals cannot be achieved or are perceived to be too difficult due to blocked legitimate 
opportunities. Researchers associate this with closed or less-open political systems (Li, 
2005). In regards to dealing with grievances, it was theoretically implied based on prior 
literature that democracies are better equipped to listen to their constituents and relieve 
strain.  
Reworded, stronger democracies, versus autocracies, should be negatively related 
to their level of domestic terrorism. However, results indicated the opposite relationship 
where a higher degree of democracy was associated with more domestic terrorism. This 
effect of democracy on domestic terrorism is one of the more robust findings across 
modeling strategies. However, the relationship between democracy and domestic 
terrorism (still positive) was insignificant in the time-ordered analysis of the 1990s.  
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Although the current study found that stronger democracies have higher terrorism, 
the effect of democracy on violence may be more nuanced and complicated. It is 
speculated that the age of democracy for a country could be a key factor for a nation’s 
degree of violence, especially for the results of the 1990s. In a cross-national homicide 
study, LaFree and Tseloni (2006) report that autocracies did not on average have higher 
rates of homicide than full democracies. They did however find that countries that were 
transitioning from autocracies to democracies saw a significant increase in their homicide 
rates. LaFree and Tseloni (2006) suggest that perhaps democracy does not have a linear 
effect but is curvilinear for violent crime. Their results supported the modernization 
hypothesis, whereas newer democracies experience heightened levels of crime but once a 
country achieves full democracy its level of violence should decline. This is relevant to 
the lack of significance for the democracy variable in Table 10. In this regression 
analysis, all developed nations except Russia and Czechoslovakia were included. It is 
possible that many of these transition countries, mostly from the dissolution of the USSR 
(i.e., Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and etc.), are responsible for these null findings. Future 
research should examine the effects of different types of democracies on levels of 
terrorism. 
Hypothesis Five 
Dissecting the broader concept of democracy, hypothesis five examined if more 
restrictions on executive decision-making power would lead to increased domestic 
terrorism. This was supported in direction and significance in the long-term pooled 
sample, but was insignificant in the time-ordered analyses. The amendment and veto 
power among the multiple branches of government common among Democracies can 
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often lead to a political stalemate, subsequently frustrating the populous (Dugan & 
Young, 2008). Political deadlock is what Li (2005) considers being a complexity 
governments deal with in their efforts to protect citizens from terrorist. Though Li’s 
(2005) research addressed transnational terrorism only, this may also be useful for 
domestic terrorism prevention as well. 
My initial perspective was that Gates et al.’s (2006) Scalar Index of Polities 
measure incorporated more components that if found to be positive for a country then it 
would lead to less domestic terrorism. Out of the six elements (i.e., election recruitment, 
competition, and openness, executive constraints on decisions, and voter turnout and 
competition between parties), only the constraints was theoretically considered to be 
positively associated with domestic terrorism. Again, this was supported in the 
contemporaneous analysis, thus supporting Dugan and Young’s (2008) veto players 
argument that executive systems with more individuals or collective members who must 
agree before a policy is passed lead to more deadlock and an eventual increase in 
terrorism. Future research should explore the independent influence of other elements of 
democracy, such as the openness of the political process, amount of veto players, as well 
as other alternative measures of democracy. The operationalization of democracy used by 
this study is less than ideal. The complexities of political orientation and domestic 
terrorism could encompass a study alone. However, the restrictions placed on political 
figures lead to increased frustration and a higher probability of domestic terrorism. The 
essence of democracy involves these checks and balances that reduce autocratic 
leadership while hindering rapid progress in certain areas. This component is one of the 
more interesting findings of this piece. Future endeavors should tackle all aspects of the 
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political regimes. Most notably, studies should consider the argument of LaFree and 
Tseloni (2006) that suggest that violent crime rates are curvilinear in transitional 
countries (going from autocratic to democratic).  
Cultural Effects 
   Modeled from the findings of Mullins and Young (2009), this study included two 
measures of cultural violence, homicide rates and a political terror scale. These measures 
are incorporated as controls only, estimating the effect of cultural violence is not the 
focus of the study.  When either of these two measures is added to the model, the percent 
of variation in the dependent variable explained goes drastically up. The political terror 
scale is positive and significantly associated with domestic terrorism. As the PTS value 
for a country increases, the probability that domestic terrorism events will occur also 
increases. Higher homicide rates are also associated with more domestic terrorism at the 
country level. The findings of higher homicides rates being linked to more domestic 
terrorism could be a product of two different things. One, I expect prior homicide to be 
associated with terrorism to a certain extent, since the terrorism data include events that 
resulted in homicides. Thus, a portion of a country’s homicide rate at time one will 
strongly be related to domestic terrorism at time two. Nevertheless, if you combine the 
positive association of prior homicide and a pre-existing context of political terror found 
in the regression analysis, this supports Mullins and Young’s (2009) culture of violence 
argument. When nations are routinely exposed to violence, they culturally heighten their 
acceptance toward violence and subsequently more cases of domestic terrorism may 
result.  
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 As previously noted in the findings section, all analyses were re-ran excluding the 
cultural violence measures and the population and democracy variables often remained 
significantly positive. The models with both pre-existing violence measures should be 
interpreted cautiously due to the potential multi-collinearity between the two controls.    
Nevertheless, this study is one of the first to examine domestic terrorism cross-
nationally and has relevant findings, yet it is not without limitations.    
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to the current study. First, this study does not 
adequately take full advantage of the time series data and thus cannot make strong causal 
inferences about the effects of structural and cultural variables on domestic terrorism. 
Second, the design assumes most of the relationships are relatively stable, constraining 
change by averaging values across time periods. Although the robustness of this 
relationship was tested within shorter intervals of time, it is likely that the assumption is 
violated in certain cases. Additionally, whereas certain macro-structural variables are 
fairly stable over time (e.g., GINI, see Gartner, 1990) other variables may indeed exhibit 
variation. Third, it is likely that the measure of domestic terrorism suffers from some 
degree of random and non-random measurement error, which affects the reliability and 
validity of the terrorism measure (Carmines & Zeller, 1979). Terrorism estimates based 
on open source data using media reports may be vulnerable to measurement error since 
some countries may have higher counts merely because reporting is more accurate or 
reliable. There could be both random and systematic (e.g., media bias; regional bias; 
certain countries more likely to have better news coverage; etc.) coding error within and 
across countries. LaFree and colleagues (2009) have also noted the potential for 
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measurement error in terrorism estimates produced by the GTD, particularly, the 
potential for confounding related violence with terrorism. The GTD is designed to 
exclude incidents that are state sanctioned or wartime related, however the researchers 
have acknowledged that during these periods of conflict it is often difficult conceptually 
and empirically to distinguish between terrorism, criminal acts or acts related to 
war/conflict (LaFree et al., 2009).  
The terrorism data, as well as the homicide data, had non-normal distributions. 
The skewed data was in part due to outliers such as Colombia and Peru. This is a 
violation of the OLS assumption of a normal distribution of residuals (Walker & Madden, 
2009). A transformation of the data is often suggested but creates difficulty in the 
interpretation of the findings. Future researchers on terrorism will likely encounter 
skewed terrorism data across even a moderate number of countries. Though a variable 
measuring region of the country was initially included in the analysis (LaFree et al., 
2009; Mullins & Young, 2009), the region variable lacked variation outside of three 
categories (i.e., Americas, Europe, and Northern Africa/Middle East). The Sub-African 
category, primarily Sub-Saharan Africa with only Mauritius, was not a quality reflection 
of the region. By reducing the sample to developed nations, Africa and other parts of the 
world were not represented. Future research should explore region-based effects on 
terrorism.  
Similar to regions, population as a concept was not maximized. This research 
included a logged country population, sex ratio, and the percent of youth in the 
population, but did not consider a country’s size or population density. A suggestion to 
future researchers would be to incorporate an outcome measure of terrorism that accounts 
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for population size such as a rate, similar to homicide rates. Standardizing population and 
including a measure for population density should both be explored as predictors of 
terrorism.  
Statistically, ordinary least squares regression was an appropriate statistical 
analysis for this initial exploration of domestic terrorism at the country level. However, 
instead of using the average of the outcome variable, one could use a more sophisticated 
statistical technique such as Poisson or negative binomial regression to deal with the 
count data. Negative binomial regression can be used to deal with the over-dispersion 
prevalent in terrorism cross-nationally. Mullins and Young (2009) advocate the use of 
zero-inflated negative binomial regression models that can accommodate multiple zeros 
and the over-dispersion common among terrorism count data.    
   Lastly, an obvious limitation involves the reduction in sample to include 
developed nations only. The results of this study struggle to be generalized outside of this 
boundary. Also, region-based variables were incorporated but due to the limitation of 
developed nations and open-sourced media collecting the data this study is regionally 
overwhelmed by European nations. Only one country fell within the Sub-African 
category. Predictors of domestic terrorism in regions outside of Europe or the Americas 
could be vastly different than what is suggested by this study.   
Conclusion 
 Whereas, terrorism is overwhelmingly domestic, this study is one of the first to 
examine domestic terrorism cross-nationally. It also adds to the miniscule amount of 
terrorism research that incorporates the use of criminological theory coupled with 
criminological data collection and methods. The two driving forces for this study were 
whether prior established predictors of criminal violence could also predict domestic 
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terrorism at the country level; and would the relationship between these macro-structural 
and cultural variables be in the same direction as previously found? After examining the 
association and relationship between economy, inequality, social welfare, political 
orientation, ethnic fractionalization, population, and pre-existing violence on domestic 
terrorism at the country level, this study reports a handful of key findings. One, stronger 
democracies actually experience more domestic terrorism. Second, the restrictions placed 
on executive power lead to more domestic terrorism events. Here lies a major policy 
implication that can be drawn from this study. This study confirms that democracy as a 
variable “matters” in relation to terrorism. Whereas, Li (2005) suggests that executive 
constraints lead to political deadlock that hinders a government’s ability to counteract 
terrorism; Dugan and Young (2008) found that more veto players within a political 
system lead to a higher likelihood that terrorism would exists and would be more 
frequent. Governments need to consider the effects that political stalemates have on their 
ability to pursue counterterrorism as well as leading to increased terrorism incidents.   
Other key findings include the degree of domestic terrorism for a country rises as 
the amount of economic inequality increases. Fourth, larger populated nations have more 
possible terrorist and more available targets. Lastly, pre-existing violence within a 
culture, most notably homicide, leads to a culture that experiences more domestic 
terrorism. All of the key findings are relevant to governmental and policy exploration, 
some of which are continuously tackled (i.e., increasing population, crime rates, 
economic inequality). However, the democracy component seems to be the most 
intriguing and devoid of governmental attention.   
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 In retrospect, the creation of the Global Terrorism Database and other data 
sources enables researchers to progress in the understanding of terrorism. The findings of 
this study alone, promote the exploration of criminological theory and methods to the 
study of terrorism. Criminologists should take an active role in findings ways to reduce 
terrorism in all forms. This is not a local phenomenon but an unfortunate global reality. If 
we are to reduce the episodes of this horrific offense, research and understanding will be 
at the heart.     
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Appendix A 
Codebook 
Concept Variable Measured 
Domestic Terrorism GTD Domestic Terrorism Annual Attacks per Country 
   
Economic Development        GDP per Capita Continuous 
   
Economic Inequality GINI Coefficient 0 to 100 
   
Social Welfare Decommodification Proxy of Expenditures Across 
Programs 
   
Government Political 
Orientation 
Gates et al. (2006) Scalar 
Index of Polities 
Average Score Across Three 
Dimensions (0 to 1) 
   
Ethnic Fractionalization        Fearon & Laitin (2003) 
Ethnic Frac. Index 
0 to 1 
   
Country Size Population  Log of Annual Population 
   
Sex  Sex Ratio # Males per 100 Females 
   
Age Youthful Population Percent Population Aged 15-29 
   
Pre-existing Violence Homicide Homicide per 100k People 
   
Cultural Violence War Involvement Dichotomy (Involved Prior Year) 
   
Cultural Violence Political Terror Scale 0 to 5 
   
Stability Transitional Nation Dichotomy (Separated/Formed) 
   
Geographic Differences Regional Connections 5 Global Regions 
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Appendix B 
  
Tables Using Listwise Deletion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1
Correlation Matrix for Incident Level of Developed Nations, 1970-1997 (Listwise deletion)
Variable
1.   Domestic Terrorism 1.000
2.   Transnational Terrorism .342 ** 1.000
3.   Total Terrorism .962 ** .369 ** 1.000
4.   Economic Development        
-.087 -.118 -.115 1.000
5.   Economic Inequality .172 * .148 * .139 -.094 1.000
6.   Decommodification  
-.154 * -.123 -.161 * .409 ** -.740 ** 1.000
7.   Democracy 
-.055 -.092 -.016 .264 ** -.588 ** .426 ** 1.000
8.   Ethnic Fractionalization        .129 .048 .129 -.032 .206 ** -.412 ** -.129 1.000
9.   Population (log) .331 ** .293 ** .312 ** .215 ** .537 ** -.489 ** -.314 ** .418 ** 1.000
10. Sex Ratio (m per 100 f) 
-.196 ** -.152 * -.201 ** -.067 -.077 .198 ** -.057 .037 -.393 ** 1.000
11. % Population 15-29
-.173 * .148 * -.204 ** -.325 ** .467 ** -.426 ** -.458 ** .245 ** .096 .208 ** 1.000
12. Homicide Rate per 100k
-.024 .148 * -.068 .129 .669 ** -.469 ** -.709 ** .207 ** .606 ** -.154 * .471 ** 1.000
13. Recent War .078 .201 ** .076 .072 .025 -.012 .031 .022 .093 -.048 -.061 .008 1.000
14. Political Terror Scale .330 ** .261 ** .307 ** -.351 ** .337 ** -.347 ** -.437 ** -.030 .159 * -.076 .147 * .228 ** .051 1.000
Significance levels * ≤ .05. ** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
11 12 13 146 7 8 9 101 2 3 4 5
85 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2
Correlation Matrix for Country Level of Developed Nations, 1970-1997 (Listwise deletion)
Variable
1.   Domestic Terrorism 1.000
2.   Transnational Terrorism .814 ** 1.000
3.   Total Terrorism .993 ** .789 ** 1.000
4.   Economic Development        
-.141 -.169 -.171 1.000
5.   Economic Inequality .128 .120 .125 -.582 ** 1.000
6.   Decommodification  
-.175 -.153 -.196 .645 ** -.841 ** 1.000
7.   Democracy 
-.116 -.209 -.123 .624 ** -.801 ** .644 ** 1.000
8.   Ethnic Fractionalization        .040 .007 .044 -.017 .291 -.296 -.176 1.000
9.   Population (log) .506 * .673 ** .456 * -.013 .310 -.294 -.363 .247 1.000
10. Sex Ratio (m per 100 f) 
-.072 -.212 -.061 -.194 .421 -.227 -.231 .235 -.039 1.000
11. % Population 15-29 .033 -.166 .047 -.584 ** .714 ** -.663 ** -.619 ** .377 .137 .543 * 1.000
12. Homicide Rate per 100k
-.024 .018 -.042 -.358 .771 ** -.574 ** -.810 ** .251 .490 * .356 .636 ** 1.000
13. Political Terror Scale .480 * .380 .498 * -.505 * .710 ** -.602 ** -.741 ** .141 .242 .289 .523 * .579 ** 1.000
Significance levels * ≤ .05. ** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
1 2 3 4 5 11 12 136 7 8 9 10
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Table 3
Regression Analysis for Long Term Pooled Sample (Listwise deletion)
Population (log) 5.341 ** 5.659 ** 4.732 * 6.782 ** 3.194
(2.195) (2.304) (2.663) (3.014) (2.734)
Ethnic Fractionalization 10.940 9.880 8.374 5.078 17.937
(15.623) (16.681) (17.527) (17.498) (15.075)
Economic Development 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(Centered) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Inequality 1.005 ** 1.036 ** 0.043
(Centered) (0.395) (0.391) (0.414)
Democracy 26.817 62.910 ***
(Centered) (19.158) (18.802)
Political Terror Scale 24.909 ***
(Centered) (5.555)
N 58 55 49 49 47
R2 0.098 0.113 0.220 0.254 0.500
Adj. R2 0.065 0.060 0.149 0.167 0.426
Constant omitted from tables.
Unstandardized B coefficients on top line, standard errors in parentheses. 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
Significance levels * ≤ .10. ** ≤ 05. *** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
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Table 4
Short-Term Cross-Sectional Analysis and Outliers (Listwise deletion)
Population (log) 7.366 * 0.493 2.607 3.601 * 4.312 **
(3.557) (3.829) (3.579) (1.794) (1.697)
Ethnic Fractionalization 3.792 10.421 9.031 4.332 0.334
(20.195) (23.794) (21.897) (10.404) (10.168)
Economic Development -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.294
(Centered) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Economic Inequality 0.053 0.185 0.272 0.141 0.375
(Centered) (0.585) (0.598) (0.595) (0.272) (0.229)
Democracy 17.507 30.182 39.975 25.072 * 11.227
(Centered) (22.598) (28.765) (32.978) (13.821) (11.122)
Political Terror Scale 0.647 18.878 * 16.565 ** 7.572 *
(Centered) (8.734) (9.642) (6.490) (4.319)
N 21 32 42 45 47
R2 0.303 0.237 0.334 0.273 0.219
Adj. R2 0.005 0.054 0.220 0.158 0.124
Outliers Removed
1970-1997
1970-1997 models have Colombia and Peru excluded.
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Outliers Removed
Constant omitted from tables.
Unstandardized B coefficients on top line, standard errors in parentheses. 
1970-1979 1980-1990 1991-1997 1970-1997
Significance levels * ≤ .10. ** ≤ 05. *** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
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Table 5
1970-1990 Predictors of 1991-1997 Domestic Terrorism (Listwise deletion)
Population (log) 6.677 * 1.748 0.075 5.897 * 6.299 ** 5.298 ** 6.125 ***
(3.355) (3.179) (3.527) (2.900) (2.738) (2.198) (2.217)
% Population Aged 15-29 0.208 -3.139 * -2.511 -1.848 -2.419 -2.756 -3.333 *
(Centered) (1.719) (1.589) (1.782) (2.032) (1.934) (1.618) (1.636)
Sex Ratio (m per f) 0.094 0.275 0.022 0.674 0.514 0.473 0.723
(Centered) (0.651) (0.540) (0.639) (1.278) (1.206) (1.071) (1.098)
Ethnic Fractionalization 11.543 20.483 20.384 15.787 15.551 15.108 14.571
(23.365) (18.640) (19.329) (15.759) (14.838) (14.327) (14.819)
Homicide 2.840 *** 2.898 *** -1.284 -0.986
(0.703) (0.717) (1.131) (1.075)
Political Terror Scale 8.288 * 11.334 * 2.779 9.127 9.058
(Centered) (4.308) (5.663) (4.864) (5.556) (5.384)
Economic Development 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(Centered) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Inequality 0.529 0.427 0.285 0.570
(Centered) (0.507) (0.480) (0.370) (0.340)
Democracy 34.624 * 36.123 ** 19.289
(Centered) (17.157) (16.471) (13.537)
N 47 44 42 33 33 34 34
R2 0.097 0.501 0.523 0.316 0.419 0.397 0.329
Adj. R2 0.011 0.420 0.425 0.088 0.192 0.204 0.148
Model GModel F
Transitional nations excluded. 
Constant omitted from tables.
Unstandardized B coefficients on top line, standard errors in parentheses. 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
Significance levels * ≤ .10. ** ≤ 05. *** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6
1991-1994 Predictors of 1995-1997 Domestic Terrorism (Listwise deletion)
Population (log) 6.389 * 6.504 *** 5.179 ** 5.217 * 5.286 0.715 4.533
(3.288) (2.100) (2.464) (2.931) (3.099) (5.353) (5.167)
% Population Aged 15-29 2.889 * -0.471 -0.581 0.591 0.659 0.038 1.443
(Centered) (1.626) (1.172) (1.554) (2.150) (2.336) (4.073) (4.182)
Sex Ratio (m per 100 f) -0.459 0.536 1.018 0.432 0.401 -1.478 -1.671
(Centered) (0.613) (0.383) (0.945) (1.227) (1.305) (2.080) (2.171)
Ethnic Fractionalization -2.834 -10.879 -10.396 -6.052 -5.665 -2.073 -20.561
(21.923) (13.088) (13.450) (17.411) (18.343) (32.274) (32.087)
Homicide 2.113 *** 2.128 *** 2.340 *** 2.340 ***
(0.252) (0.262) (0.305) (0.312)
Political Terror Scale -3.918 -1.792 -2.675 -2.665 17.838 *
(Centered) (4.262) (4.650) (6.073) (6.198) (9.573)
Economic Development 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
(Centered) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Inequality -0.500 -0.504 0.700 1.381
(Centered) (0.634) (0.649) (1.030) (1.006)
Democracy 3.027 11.093 -7.131
(Centered) (35.624) (46.151) (47.122)
N 49 46 44 34 34 35 35
R2 0.174 0.754 0.767 0.804 0.804 0.343 0.255
Adj. R2 0.099 0.716 0.722 0.742 0.731 0.141 0.062
Model GModel F
Russia and Czechoslovakia excluded. 
Constant omitted from tables.
Unstandardized B coefficients on top line, standard errors in parentheses. 
Model A Model B Model C Model D Model E
Significance levels * ≤ .10. ** ≤ 05. *** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
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Table 7
Regression Analysis of Democracy Variables (Listwise deletion)
Predictors
Domestic Terrorism
Population (log) 6.485 ** 5.671 ** 2.738
(3.122) (2.312) (2.411)
Ethnic Fractionalization 3.849 14.864 3.453
(18.183) (15.172) (12.948)
% Population Aged 15-29 -2.298 -3.228 * -0.643
(Centered) (2.149) (1.704) (1.562)
Sex Ratio (m per 100 f) 1.095 0.643 -0.511
(Centered) (1.104) (1.122) (0.885)
Executive Constraints 4.030 2.217 -5.197
(3.461) (2.510) (3.534)
Economic Development -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(Centered) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Economic Inequality 1.239 ** 0.607 0.587
(Centered) (0.484) (0.358) (0.379)
N 49 34 35
R2 0.264 0.297 0.395
Adj. R2 0.138 0.108 0.238
Unstandardized B coefficients on top line, standard errors in parentheses. 
Constant omitted from tables.
Russia and Czechoslovakia excluded from 1991-1994 predictors of 1995-1997 domestic terrorism. 
Transitional nations excluded from 1970-1990 predictors of 1991-1997 domestic terrorism. 
Significance levels * ≤ .10. ** ≤ 05. *** ≤ .01. (2-tailed). 
1991-1994
1995-1997
1970-1990
1991-1997
1970-1997
1970-1997
